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Abstract 
The objectives of this study are to understand what drives professors’ motivation and what 
kind of rewarding supports especially their intrinsic motivation. From this point of view, the 
ultimate objective is to develop a proposal for a new, holistic reward system for tenured 
professors at Aalto University. In this study, motivational theories are used to approach 
rewarding because motivation is an important driver of professors’ performance and in most 
cases, it is affected by rewarding.  
The study was conducted as a part of a project that develops a new rewarding model as a 
proposal for the management of Aalto University. Because a new model is created as a result 
of this thesis, it is a constructive case study. The primary data used to support the model 
consists of a survey targeted to professors at Aalto University, two additional interviews with 
professors, and eight management interviews. In addition, internal material from the 
university, material from the project team’s meeting, and other discussions about the topic 
by professors were used as complementary data. 
The key findings of this study indicate that professors are indeed primarily intrinsically 
motivated but that their overall motivation is affected by external rewards as well. Moreover, 
if external rewards are poorly designed, a crowding-out effect occurs. Professors highly value 
academic freedom and trust and prefer forms of rewarding that enhance those elements in 
their work. They are also extremely inequity averse; therefore, if they perceive rewarding 
inequitable, their intrinsic motivation is affected negatively. 
Both the professors and the management were quite unanimous with the elements that the 
overall reward system should consist of. They preferred merit increase as the individual form 
of rewarding for long-term performance and additional resources to acknowledge the 
achievements of research groups or individual researchers. Finally, more pronounced and 
visible recognition of extraordinary accomplishments and success was called for. These 
elements together form a reward system that takes the long-term nature of professors’ work 
into account but on the other hand allows for recognizing single achievements within a short 
time. It supports their autonomy of work, advances their competence, and enhances their 
relatedness to the organization if communicated correctly. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Tutkielman tavoitteena on ymmärtää, mitkä tekijät vaikuttavat yliopistoprofessorien moti-
vaatioon ja minkälaiset palkitsemisen muodot tukevat erityisesti heidän sisäistä motivaatio-
taan. Tutkimuksen pääasiallisena tavoitteena on kehittää uusi, kokonaisvaltainen palkit-
semisjärjestelmä Aalto-yliopiston vakinaisille professoreille siitä näkökulmasta, miten pal-
kitseminen säilyttää ja tukee heidän sisäistä motivaatiotaan. Motivaatioteoriat valittiin tut-
kielman lähestymistavaksi palkitsemiseen, sillä motivaatio on yksi suurimmista professorien 
työsuoritukseen vaikuttavista tekijöistä, ja siihen on mahdollista vaikuttaa palkitsemisen 
avulla. 
Tutkimus toteutettiin osana projektia, jonka tarkoituksena on kehittää Aalto-yliopistolle 
uusi kokonaispalkitsemisen malli. Koska myös tämä tutkielma kehittää palkitsemisjärjestel-
män tiettyyn organisaatioon, on se konstruktiivinen tapaustutkimus. Mallin rakentamisen 
pohjaksi käytetty aineisto koostuu pääasiassa Aalto-yliopiston professoreille suunnatun 
kyselyn vastauksista, kahden professorin täydentävistä haastatteluista sekä kahdeksasta 
yliopiston johdon haastattelusta. Lisäaineistona on käytetty yliopiston sisäisiä materiaaleja 
liittyen palkitsemiseen, projektiryhmän kokousten materiaalia sekä muita professorien 
esimerkiksi sähköpostin välityksellä aiheesta käymiä keskusteluja. 
Tutkimuksen keskeiset löydökset tukevat havaintoa, että professorit ovat pääasiallisesti 
sisäisesti motivoituneita työtään kohtaan, mutta toisaalta heidän motivaatioonsa voi vaikut-
taa myös ulkoisen palkitsemisen avulla. Ulkoisten palkkioiden vaikutus on ilmeinen etenkin, 
jos niiden toteutuksessa ei ole onnistuttu ottamaan yliopistomaailman kontekstia huomioon; 
tällöin motivaation syrjäytymisvaikutus on todennäköistä. Professorit arvostavat akatee-
mista vapautta sekä sitä, että heihin luotetaan. Palkitsemisen muodoista he kannattavat 
sellaisia, jotka tukevat näitä asioita heidän työssään. He kaihtavat myös erittäin paljon 
epäoikeudenmukaisuutta palkitsemisessa, minkä vuoksi epäoikeudenmukaiseksi koettu 
palkitseminen vaikuttaa negatiivisesti heidän sisäiseen motivaatioonsa. 
Sekä professorit että yliopiston johto olivat lähes yksimielisiä kokonaispalkitsemisen 
elementeistä. Henkilökohtaisen, pitkän aikavälin suorituksen palkitsemiseksi kannatettiin 
meriittikorotuksia ja tutkimusryhmän tai yksittäisen tutkijan palkitsemiseksi lisäresursseja 
kyseiselle yksikölle. Erityislaatuisten saavutusten ja menestyksen tehokkaampaa näkyväksi 
tekemistä ja tunnustamista kaivattiin myös. Nämä elementit muodostavat yhdessä 
kokonaispalkitsemisen mallin, joka oikein viestittynä tukee professorien työn autonomiaa, 
edistää heidän kompetenssiaan sekä lisää yhteenkuuluvuuden tunnetta yhteisön kanssa. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Performance management and measurement in universities have been hot topics both within 
academia and in media in recent years. They raise strong criticism amongst academics while 
the idea of performance management does not seem to fit the university environment. On one 
hand, professors are intrinsically motivated in the first place (e.g. Chen;Gupta;& Hoshower, 
2006) and have a desire to do science with their best capabilities; and on the other hand, their 
work is hard to compress into traditional measures (Blaxter;Hughes;& Tight, 1998). As Janne 
Saarikivi wrote in his column in Helsingin Sanomat (2014): “Measuring creativity and 
innovation is like trying to determine with scientific precision which one is better, rösti or ice 
cream.”  
 Especially the university reform in 2010 increased the emphasis on performance 
measurement in Finland, introducing a completely new Funding Model according to which 
the governmental funding of universities is determined based on quantitative measures. This 
reflects to individual universities where measuring the performance of the units and individual 
members of academic staff has become a common practice. This is often connected to linking 
pay to performance, and many Finnish universities are indeed implementing an incentive 
system for their professors (Kallio, 2014). However, the discussion is mostly separate from an 
essential factor of professors’ work performance: their strong intrinsic motivation to do 
science. In order to fully understand the effects of rewarding for performance on the 
professors, understanding how their motivation works in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic 
sources of motivation is essential.  
The phenomenon of using corporate practices but have found their way to public sector 
organizations as well was named New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1991). Even 
though one of the positive effects that is aimed at by using NPM is to increase the efficiency 
of organizations, this is not often the outcome in practice. This can be due to many factors but 
the main reason is often that the organization and its employees are not taken into account in 
the planning phase and especially the quality aspect is neglected (Fryer;Antony;& Ogden, 
2009). Academic work is often hard to compare with objective measures. The most visible 
effects of NPM often are more pronounced bureaucracy and administration “even though they 
do not fit the universities’ working environment in tone” (Tikkanen, 2014). 
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Even though NPM by definition has received string criticism within the academic world (e.g. 
Sehested, 2002), managerial practices seem to have settled in universities. Therefore 
universities should consider how to implement the practices in order to reduce the possible 
conflicts to a minimum. As NPM has an impact on the rewarding of university professors in 
many cases, considering how the traditional methods of rewarding can be used for professors 
successfully requires recognizing how they differ from private sector employees. One 
distinguishing factor between professors and private sector employees is the nature of their 
motivation: professors typically have strong intrinsic motivation and are less driven by 
external motivators than employees in the corporate world (Chen et al., 2006). Since one of 
the objectives of performance-based rewarding is to create extrinsic motivators for employees 
(Henri, 2006), its effects on professors’ motivation and further the relationship between 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation should be acknowledged. As work motivation has found to 
contribute to work performance (Pepper & Gore, 2012), it has a significant impact on the 
realized performance.  
Academic literature recognizes several motivation theories that have been used in studies 
about employee incentives. Agency theory is one of the classic theories explaining incentives 
but it has been criticized for not taking human behavior into account. Therefore behavioral 
agency theory has been developed: it combines traditional agency theory and other theories 
that explain human behavior and motivation, such as crowding-out theory and expectancy 
theory. (Pepper & Gore, 2012.) As performance-based rewarding is often said to have two 
objectives, steering (Handolin, 2004) and motivating (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002) employees, it 
has a significant impact on their overall motivation. Hence, in order to create a reward system 
for professors that affects their performance positively, the analysis of how rewarding and 
work motivation interact with each other is essential. 
This thesis will bring insight into how professors can be motivated with performance-based 
rewarding. It creates a theoretical framework around theories about work motivation, human 
behavior, reward systems, and universities as public sector organizations, each field having a 
great deal of literature and studies written. There are plenty of studies that combine 
motivation and behavioral theories (e.g. Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), rewarding and 
motivation theories (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002), and performance management in universities 
(ter Bogt & Scapens, 2012) as well but there are very few articles that study how 
performance-based rewarding affects professors’ motivation and consequently performance. 
Thereby, there is a clearly visible research gap that e.g. Rantanen, Kulmala, Lönnqvist, and 
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Kujansivu (2007) point out: the public-sector-specific factors affecting the design and 
implementation of a performance measurement system (PMS) should be taken into account 
when creating an effective PMS in practice. Furthermore, literature that combines university 
performance management and motivating academics is rather narrow (Pinto & Pulido, 1997) 
and literature about rewarding in universities even more limited; hence, there seems to be a 
need for an analysis that covers reward systems in universities and includes their effects on 
professors’ work motivation as well. 
This thesis was conducted as a part of a project developing a new reward system for tenured 
professors in Aalto University. The aim of the project is to create a suggestion for the 
university management that is based on the professors’ wishes and needs and that can be 
further developed by the management and will eventually replace the current incentive system 
with a new, holistic reward system. 
1.2 Objectives and limitations 
The main objective for this thesis arises from the practical need to develop a new reward 
system in Aalto University. Rewarding will be approached from the professors’ point of view: 
what are the effects of rewarding on their motivation and consequently performance? The 
university management’s point of view will be considered as well because the organization’s 
objectives cannot be neglected when designing a reward system. However, the main focus is 
on the professors. Therefore, the research question is as follows:  
How can professors be rewarded based on their performance in order to 
maintain their intrinsic motivation and to create external motivators to 
perform towards the university’s strategic goals? 
As said, the primary objective for this study is to develop a proposal for a new, holistic 
reward system for tenured professors at Aalto University. In order to construct the proposal, it 
is important to find out what drives professors’ motivation and what kinds of rewards support 
professors’ intrinsic motivation. Hence, these are the secondary objectives of the study. 
As the case organization is a university, the thesis will focus on the academic world even 
though New Public Management can be applied in the entire public sector. This limitation is 
chosen also because there are differences between employees in different public sector 
organizations and therefore the results could not be put into perspective as well as when 
examining only universities. Furthermore, the more specific employee group under 
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examination is tenured professors because their position is secured and is not affected by their 
performance. Consequently, their motivation is not so much influenced by career concerns 
because of the secured position. In Aalto University the focus is on Full Professors because 
they have reached tenure as well as a state in their career where there are no more official 
career steps as external motivators left. 
As for rewarding, the thesis will focus on rewards that are given based on performance. Even 
though it is an essential part of overall rewarding, it is assumed that fixed salary cannot be 
affected by the reform and it is taken for granted. Furthermore, covering both the structure 
and the entire process and communication of rewarding would expand the research too 
extensive to be covered in a master’s thesis. That is why this thesis will principally focus on 
the structure of rewarding only, leaving the process and how to communicate the system in 
practice in a minor role. 
1.3 Methods and data 
The empirical research is a qualitative case study while it examines a management accounting 
phenomenon in a specific organization and context (Aaltio-Marjosola, 1999), the case 
organization being Aalto University. As said, this thesis is related to a project developing a 
new reward system for Aalto University. The project was initiated because of the remarkable 
dissatisfaction that was brought out by several professors. A project team was formed to 
prepare a proposal and it consisted of professors from all the schools of Aalto University as 
well as two HR representatives and the author of this thesis as a student member. The project 
team met on regular basis during 2014, and the meetings were a platform for brainstorming 
and developing the new model based on the empirical data collected for this thesis. As the 
main objective of the thesis is to design a solution for the problem of how to construct a 
functioning reward system, it is a constructive case study (Kasanen;Lukka;& Siitonen, 1993). 
The primary source of the data used in the study is a survey that was targeted to all the 
professors at Aalto University, including Full, Associate, and Assistant Professors as well as 
Professors of Practice. The survey consisted of questions regarding potential rewarding 
elements, criteria used for evaluation, professors’ motivation towards different work-related 
tasks, and opinions about previous and current rewarding within the university as well as 
demographic questions. Furthermore, two additional interviews with ARTS professors were 
conducted because the response rate within ARTS was low, 11.3 %. It was perceived 
important to assess the university management’s point of view as well and therefore eight 
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interviews were conducted with management representatives including the President and the 
Provost of Aalto University as well as the Deans of the schools. All ten interviews were 
conducted as theme interviews. Besides the survey and the interviews, other university-
specific material such as emails and discussions about incentive systems were used in order to 
look into the current reward system and the opinions about rewarding in general. In addition, 
the material from the project team meetings as well as some internal material was used. 
1.4 Structure 
The theory section of this thesis consists of Chapters 2 and 3. Firstly, the context of the study 
takes place is presented in Chapter 2 in which the university environment is introduced. This 
is done through three different theoretical perspectives: first, the concept of New Public 
Management is presented; secondly, the relevant regulations that affect universities’ 
performance management in Finland are covered; and thirdly, some typical features of 
academic careers are looked into in more detail. Chapter 3 builds the motivational framework 
starting from traditional agency theory and expanding to behavioral theories of work 
motivation by introducing Behavioral Agency Theory. Chapter 3.1.3 sets the motivation 
theories into the university context. The second half of Chapter 3 covers reward systems and 
similarly examines them in the academic world. 
After the literature review, Chapter 4 introduces the case organization, Aalto University, and 
covers the research methods and data used in the empirical analysis. Chapter 5 first describes 
the background for rewarding in the case university, covering the strategy, the university-
specific contract with the Ministry of Education and Culture, and the internal funding model 
of Aalto University. The empirical findings are examined in Chapters 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, starting 
from the professors’ motivation and further going through their as well as the management’s 
perspectives of the former and the current reward systems as well as the future system. 
Chapter 6 builds the proposal for the new system based on these perceptions and discusses the 
findings of the empirical research reflecting the theoretical framework. Finally, Chapter 7 
concludes the thesis, discusses the central defects of the study, and gives suggestions for 
further study.  
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2 UNIVERSITY ENVIRONMENT 
Oxford Dictionaries defines a ‘university’ as “a high-level educational institution in which 
students study for degrees and academic research is done” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2014). The 
history of modern universities dates back in the 12
th
 century and they have typically been 
strongly associated with building knowledge and distributing it (Denman, 2005). By 
combining different definitions, it can be concluded that the basic tasks of universities are 
research and education as well as advancing the surrounding society by sharing knowledge. 
Additionally, universities have traditionally been non-commercial institutions concentrating 
on these basic tasks but recently they have faced increasing demands of raising market and 
economic orientations: universities are increasingly competing with each other in acquiring 
funding, for instance (ibid.). Responding to these relatively new demands has changed the 
practices and structures of universities in many countries. 
Even though the basic functions are more or less the same in universities globally, the ways in 
which they are organized differ from each other depending on the geographic area. For 
instance, funding of universities can be organized in several different ways. In the US there 
are both public and private universities and they both obtain their funding typically from 
private sources such as donations, research grants, tuitions, or sales and services rather than 
public funding (Labaree, 2010). European universities more typically get most of their 
funding from governments and other public institutions and many of the countries allocate 
university funding based on performance-based schemes
1
 (Hicks, 2012). As mentioned above, 
irrespective of the sources of funding the trend has been that universities face increasing 
pressures of higher efficiency and accountability (Geuna & Martin, 2003). Furthermore, the 
pressures are especially typical in countries where funding is granted based on performance. 
This trend has emerged together with the concept of New Public Management (NPM), a 
theory that explains the use of private sector management practices in public sector 
organizations. 
Partly as a consequence of the increased accountability demands towards universities, 
performance measurement has found its way inside the universities as well. Universities are 
increasingly measuring individual professors’ performance and therewith connecting parts of 
rewarding to performance has increased as well. Typically, these are used as management                                         
control tools in private sector organizations in order to steer employees’ actions. However, in 
                                                 
1
 e.g. UK, Sweden, Finland, Italy, Poland 
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universities the conflict between the interests of management and professors is not nearly as 
strong as in the private sector, mainly because the management often consists of professors 
itself (Blaxter et al., 1998). That is just one example of issues that differentiate universities 
from traditional private sector corporations. These distinguishing factors are those that should 
be recognized when using performance measurement and performance-related rewarding as a 
private sector practice in universities. 
In the following subchapters, NPM is first covered in more detail. Secondly, the laws and 
regulations that give guidelines for universities’ performance and determine the allocation of 
funding in Finland are briefly presented. Finally, I will go through some of the idiosyncrasies 
of academic careers, such as tenures, that assumedly affect professors’ performance and thus 
should be regarded in connection with performance management in universities. 
2.1 New Public Management 
The trend in the past decades in the public sector and correspondingly in universities has been 
that private sector performance management and measurement have become more popular 
and even a norm in the public sector (Pollitt, 1995). Hood (1991) conceptualized the 
phenomenon of using private sector practices in the public sector by using the term New 
Public Management. NPM has been a debated concept since its development, having both 
critics (e.g. Adcroft and Willis, 2005; Sehested, 2002; Marginson, 2000) and proponents 
(Smeemk;Teelken;Eisinga;& Doorewaard, 2009; Hood, 1991). The criticism has concentrated 
on the misfit of managerial practices with public sector features, the “difficulties in importing 
managerial practices from one context to another” (Adcroft & Willis, 2005), and the 
undermining of professionalism as a governing principle in organizations traditionally led by 
professionals (Sehested, 2002). Meanwhile, the supporters argue that NPM makes public 
sector organizations more efficient and improves the quality of performance (Smeemk et al., 
2009) as well as fosters innovation and less hierarchical structures (Kallio, 2014). 
The concept of NPM was generated because the use of private sector practices and 
professional management in the public sector increased from the late 70s (Adcroft & Willis, 
2005). The basic idea of the concept is that performance management practices such as 
increased budgeting that are common in the private sector are adopted in the public sector 
(Smeemk et al., 2009). The concept of NPM originates from the Anglo-Saxon cultures and 
especially Great Britain, and it should be noted that there are differences between the Anglo-
Saxon, central European, and the Nordic public sectors, to start with. The Nordic model, for 
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instance, is said to implement only parts of NPM and to have a longer history with some NPM 
elements such as decentralization and the autonomy of public units (Sehested, 2002). Whilst 
there are different definitions of NPM and no universal framework exists, an example list of 
the private sector practices that public sector organizations can use according to NPM is as 
follows (Fryer;Antony;& Ogden, 2009): 
 the employment of professional managers; 
 explicit standards and measures of performance; 
 greater emphasis on consistency of services; 
 decentralisation; 
 increased competition between organisations and sub-units; 
 emphasis on private-sector management styles; and 
 increased accountability and parsimony in resource use. 
In this study, I will limit concentrate on the use of explicit standards and measures from the 
university point of view, and more specifically performance measurement linked to 
rewarding. 
Even though NPM is a widely used framework for describing how public sector organizations 
and consequently universities are managed, there seems to be few scholars presenting the 
benefits of the concept. Hood (1991) points out the political neutrality of NPM and remarks 
that different values can be communicated effectively by using private sector practices. As for 
other public sector organizations, universities can benefit from NPM practices, especially 
performance management, by finding out where the university stands at a given moment in 
striving towards its goals and seeing what should be done differently (Adcroft & Willis, 
2005). Smeemk et al. (2009) found, in turn, that managerialism did have a modest positive 
influence on the quality of performance amongst European university employees. There was a 
weak indirect negative effect which was cancelled out by a positive direct effect and thus no 
conflict was found between managerialism and the quality of university performance, as 
opposed to the points of views of many other scholars. Additionally, OECD has taken a 
strong role in pushing its member governments and governmental organizations towards 
implementing NPM and in advocating for its use and supposed benefits (Pal & Ireland, 2009), 
which might have increased the use of NPM in certain countries. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be more academics criticizing rather than praising NPM. Many 
scholars recall the concentration on quantitative and the lack of qualitative data and measures 
as one of the key reasons why performance management struggles in the public sector and 
especially in universities (see e.g. Fryer et al. 2009, Kallio 2014). NPM has found to have a 
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deconstructive effect on academic performance deriving from the complexity of universities 
and academic work (Adcroft & Willis, 2005). NPM has also been seen as a ‘declaration of 
war’ against professionals in public organizations because private sector practices have been 
used in a way that diminishes their autonomy and trust in them (Sehested, 2002). Because 
university professors are professionals, they might similarly see it as a threat as well.  
As can be reasoned from the criticism, using NPM practices is not a straightforward issue in 
the public sector. The problems often arise if managerial practices are transferred directly to 
the non-profit, mission-oriented world without considering the context in which they are 
applied. Therefore interpreting NPM too literally without integrating it to the public sector 
context might cause frustration and opposite effects than what are sought. By introducing 
increasing hierarchy, audit mechanisms, and subordination, the impact of professional norms 
and values are reduced (Sehested, 2002), which might cause frustration amongst professors 
used to academic freedom. The criticism indicates that when applying private sector practices 
in a university, one needs to be very careful with the execution: if the management fails to 
take the characteristics of universities and professors into account, performance is more likely 
to be impaired (Fryer et al. 2009). However, when talking about NPM in the public sector, a 
‘softer’ version can be applied: a version where the professionals are restrained with control 
systems as little as possible. This way misusing NPM can be avoided. By misusing I mean 
applying NPM practices only for the sake of doing so rather than giving a thought on the 
consequences and what the objectives and goals of using them are. 
Since most of the management accounting literature about reward systems and literature about 
work motivation have had the corporate world in focus, NPM has been an initiative to 
incorporate those theories into the public world. There has been an assumption that employees 
in the corporate world and in universities differ from each other with regard to their 
motivation and motivation drivers (Buelens & Van den Broeck, 2007). This is why 
transferring private sector practices into the public sector has been criticised as a phenomenon 
by many scholars even though NPM as a theory has been used in a number of academic 
studies about the public sector. NPM can, however, be used to translate the differences 
between the private and public sectors. In addition, since one of the main differences between 
private sector and especially university employees is the difference between their motivation 
drivers, examining motivation theories in the light of NPM brings more insight into the 
analysis. Also the effect of introducing NPM practices in universities on the professors’ 
motivation is interesting.  
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2.2 Finnish regulations 
When looking at Finnish laws and regulations regarding universities, NPM trends and 
performance-based funding allocations are clearly visible. The Universities Act itself does not 
take a stand on performance management directly, but the funding of universities regulated in 
the law is directly related to the performance of universities. The Funding Model that 
determines the different forms of funding of universities, in turn, defines clear criteria for the 
outputs of universities. This is clearly one way of incorporating NPM in the academic context 
already at the legislative level. This is in accordance with the intentions of OECD to increase 
efficiency in public sector organizations through public sector reforms (e.g. Pal & Ireland, 
2009).  
The university legislation and the university system in Finland have features that affect 
performance management in individual universities both directly and indirectly. Their impact 
is often transferred into practice through the adaptation of NPM: by introducing performance 
measures and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), for instance. Even though the basic setting 
is similar to those of most western countries (Rantanen et al., 2007), the new Universities Act 
that came into effect in 2010 and the new Funding Model of universities differ from other 
countries’ regulations in some aspects. One of the biggest changes that the act established was 
in the legal form of universities: universities are either corporations under public law (public 
universities) or private foundation universities governed by the Foundations Act (Universities 
Act 558/2009). In this section, I will introduce the relevant characteristics of the national 
regulations that have influence on rewarding in universities. 
Universities Act and University Funding Model 
As mentioned above, the Universities Act was renewed in 2009 and the new act came into 
force in the beginning of 2010. The Universities Act states the following: 
The mission of the universities is to promote free research and 
academic and artistic education, to provide higher education based on 
research, and to educate students to serve their country and humanity. 
In carrying out their mission, the universities must promote lifelong 
learning, interact with the surrounding society and promote the impact 
of research findings and artistic activities on society. 
The universities must arrange their activities so as to assure a high 
international standard in research, education and teaching in 
conformity with ethical principles and good scientific practices. 
(Universities act 558/2009) 
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Thus, the Universities Act highlights the two main missions of universities, research and 
education. In addition, interacting with society while conducting these tasks, internalization, 
and high ethical standards are given a strong emphasis on. These priorities are directly 
adapted into the Funding Model by determining the focus areas of allocating the financing of 
universities. 
The idea of the new Funding Model is that the state provides funding for the core activities: 
degree education, basic conditions for research, and interaction with society through the 
previous activities. Further funding for profiling the university and for the special needs of the 
university is left for the universities to gather and compete for with each other. (Universities 
Funding Model, 2012.) The overall funding thus consists of the basic funding provided by the 
government and competitive funding including paid services, donations, and sponsoring 
(OKM, 2014; see Figure 1). Since the 1990’s, the amount of external funding has multiplied 
and increased rapidly both in absolute and relative terms (Kuoppala, 2005).  
What is notable in Figure 1 is that education, research, and political goals define the 
guidelines for the governmental funding. The goals set by the Ministry of Education and 
Culture (Universities Funding Model, 2012) thus set the frames for the activities of individual 
universities, which has been visible in the goals and similarly the incentive schemes of 
universities (Kallio, 2014). Even though Finnish universities have gained more autonomy 
over the content of teaching and research, personnel policies, and resource allocation since the 
1990s, the governmental funding schemes have had a significant influence on their behavior 
and strategies (Kuoppala, 2005). They in turn have formed a base for the compensation 
systems that are used in many of the Finnish universities. This way, even though universities 
are seemingly autonomous, the government has maneuvered the goal-setting and performance 
management of Finnish universities significantly. Indeed, the new legislation has affected the 
strategic and financial management as well as management systems in universities even 
though the some of the goals set by the government are seen contradictory (Kallio, 2014).  
What comes to planning and budgeting in universities, they are not as independent as the 
wording in the Universities Act suggests
2
 but is strongly affected by the contracts between 
each university in Finland and the Ministry of Education and Culture (OKM, 2014). The 
contracts are renegotiated every four years and they contain a performance agreement  
 
                                                 
2
 ‘corporations under public law’ or ‘independent foundations’ instead of purely public organizations 
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Figure 1: Basic funding of universities 
The basic funding of universities from the year 2013 onwards (Universities Funding Model, 2012). 
 
including the operational and quantitative goals of the university in question as well as the 
allocation required for achieving the goals (Hölttä, 1998). Consequently, also the monitoring 
and evaluation are agreed upon in the negotiations and thus are not only by the universities to 
decide but institutionally determined. Hence, NPM in the forms of monitoring and evaluation, 
i.e. performance management, is built in to universities by the state authorities already. Each 
of the contracts has the same overall goals that are aligned with the goals of the Ministry of 
Education and Culture, i.a. the following: improving the overall quality of teaching, gaining 
competitiveness through research and innovative actions, and guaranteeing quality through 
internalization (Contract Aalto University, 2012).   
This, however, does not automatically mean that the evaluation of individuals was built in 
similarly; the contract covers primarily the university-wide performance (Hölttä, 1998). How 
the contract does influence the individual level is through strategy and the overall objectives 
that affect unit-level and furthermore individual goals. This is consistent with the latest of the 
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three doctrines
3
, management by results (Kuoppala, 2005). In the management by results 
doctrine, universities are seen as entrepreneurial units with a strong influence and drive from 
the market forces instead of only being government-regulated institutions (Kuoppala, 2005). 
A similar trend can be seen globally as the market orientation of universities has grown in 
other countries as well (e.g. Modell, 2003). While universities have gained more autonomy 
over the content of teaching and research, personnel policy, budgeting, and internal 
organization since the 1990s, the governmental bodies remain with a tight grasp in steering 
the actions of universities through the university-specific contracts at the same time 
(Kuoppala, 2005).  
All in all, the orientation towards a more performance and market oriented university 
environment by the government in Finland is familiar from universities around the world 
(Geuna & Martin, 2003). New Public Management is in a way forced on to universities by 
governments already, making them follow certain performance indicators regularly. Even 
though those indicators are university-wide, in many cases individual performance 
measurement is used as if as a consequence of organizational-level indicators and moreover 
connected to the rewarding of individual professors (Kallio, 2014). These are the 
circumstances that universities in many countries have to adapt with but without recognizing 
the differences with the private sector, NPM practices might have negative effects on their 
performance. 
2.3 Academic careers 
Academic careers have also distinctive features from those of the private sector. A popular 
way to organize the employment of university professors is tenures. The employment and 
career structure of professors often follow tenure tracks, even though in some countries such 
as Australia the proportion of tenured staff is decreasing (Marginson, 2000). The dominating 
features of tenures are the stability of the employment relationship because the employee has 
the post until retirement, and fixed salary that might increase on the basis of a pre-determined 
scale, e.g. service time, or through salary negotiations. For instance, tenure tracks are used in 
many universities both globally and in Finland
4
. 
There has been discussion about whether tenures are the most optimal way to organize 
academic careers and if they should be replaced with renewable contracts (Bess, 1998; 
                                                 
3
 The three doctrines are the official Finnish state higher education policies (Kuoppala, 2005) 
4
 e.g. Aalto University, University of Eastern Finland, and Tampere University of Technology 
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McPherson & Schapiro, 1999). Tenures are found, for instance, to lower the level of stress 
related to future earnings (Thorsen, 1996) and provide academics freedom and flexibility to 
carry out their academic work (Nir & Zilberstein-Levy, 2006). On the other hand, a tenure 
system creates some costs as well; for instance, tenures are claimed to reduce the efficiency of 
the faculty (Bess, 1998) and to protect mainly those professors who do not publish or teach 
much and are not motivated to do their work from uncertainty; well-performing professors 
would have an optional place to go to (Tullock, 1996).  
Without taking a stand on whether tenures are the most optimal way to organize professors’ 
careers, the influence of tenure on the professors’ work motivation is an interesting question. 
Nir and Zilberstein-Levy (2006) suggest that tenure maintains faculty members’ motivation to 
pursue new goals. Tullock (1996) offers a different opinion by stating that tenure allows free-
riding and laziness. All in all, most of the academic literature seems to have a consensus that 
tenure system is improving professors’ motivation (e.g. McPherson & Schapiro, 1999; 
Carmichael, 1988); however it must be born in mind that the authors publishing on the topic 
are professors themselves, which might bias their interpretations. On the other hand, those 
who choose an academic career tend to have strong intrinsic motivation towards their work 
(Bailey, 1999), which keeps the level of their performance and quality of work naturally 
higher regardless of whether they have a safe position of not. Carmichael’s (1988) model 
suggests that if tenure was abolished, the most prominent young scholars would feel their 
future job prospects to be endangered, which would in turn affect overall motivation 
negatively. 
The motivational aspect of tenure is interesting: as concluded, it fits well with people who are 
heavily internally motivated in the first place since they do not need strong monetary 
motivators to perform well. However, there might be people whose overall motivation, after 
getting tenured, could be increased by introducing some external motivators even if they had 
strong internal motivation. One way how universities often combine tenures with external, 
performance-based motivators is by including a merit pay in their salary systems (Kasten, 
1984). This is also consistent with the NPM thinking by having some performance measures 
through which a university management tries to influence professors’ performance. The next 
chapter will discuss the aspects of work motivation that should be considered while 
developing performance-based rewarding for professors as well as ways to organize overall 
rewarding when tenure exists.  
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3 WORK MOTIVATION AND REWARD SYSTEMS IN UNIVERSITIES 
Reward systems are one way of integrating the actions of employees with the organizational 
goals and consequently with the organization’s strategy (Kaplan & Norton, 2001). In 
academia, the path from performance to organizational goals follows partly the same steps as 
in the corporate world but there are, however, contextual differences between employees and 
the nature of work between these two environments. In addition, work motivation usually 
appears in different forms in academia and in the corporate world even though the basic 
motivation theories can be applied in both contexts. In this chapter, I will build a motivational 
framework for this study by using behavioral agency theory as a basis and applying it in the 
university context. Finally, I will review the previous literature about reward systems and 
combine it with the motivation theories as well as the university context. 
3.1 Work motivation 
Work motivation has been an important concept in management accounting research, used to 
support the theories of control systems and rewarding, for instance. It has been given 
definitions varying from broad (Wright, 2001) to more detailed (Graham & Weiner, 1996). 
Nevertheless, as with many other theoretical concepts, work motivation has no dominant 
definition (Mitchell, 1982). Wright (2001) defines the primary objective of work motivation 
research as “not -- to learn why employees act as they do but, instead, to learn how to 
motivate employees to perform the duties and responsibilities assigned by the organization”. 
Following this paradigm, work motivation can be perceived as an employee’s motivation to 
perform the tasks and responsibilities set for them by the organization, also performance 
quality being a part of the definition.  
There are a great number of different motivation theories and their extensions regarding 
incentives and work motivation, for instance the classic theories such as Maslow’s (1954) 
need hierarchy theory, Herzberg’s motivation-hygiene theory (Herzberg;Mausner;& 
Snyderman, 1959), and agency theory (Baker;Jensen;& Murphy, 1988). These theories serve 
as a basis for various studies; for instance agency theory has been used in economic studies 
and studies about management incentives especially. However, the behavioral aspects have 
often been neglected in motivation theories. To respond to this shortcoming, Pepper and Gore 
(2012) have further developed behavioral agency theory (BAT) based on previous literature 
(e.g. Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Behavioral agency theory is based on, as can be 
noted, traditional agency theory but additionally combines theories about extrinsic and 
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intrinsic motivation, crowding-out theory, and expectancy theory (Pepper & Gore, 2012), for 
instance. The following chapters will go into these theories, starting from traditional agency 
theory and continuing with BAT and its building blocks. 
3.1.1 Traditional agency theory 
As stated above, one of the traditional theories explaining incentives and aligning the interests 
of an employer and employees is agency theory. Agency theory seems to be applicable for 
many different academic orientations such as accounting, social sciences, economics, finance, 
and organizational behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989a). The basic assumption in agency theory is 
that an agency relationship, a contract, exists where a principal and an agent with conflicting 
interests are parties to (Tosi;Katz;& Gomez-Mejia, 1997). The agent has some decision 
making power on behalf of the principal(s) but due to the probable conflict of interest, they do 
not always use the decision making power according to the best interests of the agent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). Because of this paradigm, the following types of agency costs can occur: 
1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, 2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, and 
3) the residual loss, i.e. the loss that occurs despite of the monitoring and bonding (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). 
Besides having conflicting goals, agency problems can occur because the principal cannot be 
aware of everything the agent does and may lack essential information (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
Monitoring is often a solution to this problem (Tosi et al., 1997): the principal can introduce 
an information system to better follow the agent’s actions. Another option to reduce the 
conflict of interests as well as minimize the agency problem arising from insufficient 
information is to provide the agent with incentives in order to align the interests of the agent 
and the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989a). However, if the incentive is based on objective 
indicators, there is a danger that the agent will start gaming with them: it is possible to 
improve or manipulate the numbers that the incentives are based on and ignore the 
unobservable dimensions of performance (Dixit, 2002). 
Several scholars have pointed out the deficiencies of agency theory (see e.g. Pepper & Gore, 
2012; Steel & König, 2006; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 
1998). For instance, agency theory overlooks the intrinsic motivation factors and assumes 
monitoring and contracting to be the best options for aligning the goals of the principal and 
the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989a). However, Besley and Ghatak (2005) found that motivated 
agents do exist, especially in non-profit and public sector, including universities – mission-
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oriented organizations – and thus the goals of the principal and the agent are inherently closer 
to each other. Additionally, what comes to universities, the gap between management (often 
consisting of academics as well) and employees, namely professors and other academics, is 
quite narrow and the management understands the needs and drivers of the employees. This 
originates from academic leadership (Ramsden;Prosser;Trigwell;& Martin, 2007): a 
department chair, for instance, is often chosen amongst the professors of the department and 
hence represents both of the parties, the management as well as the employees. This is one of 
the factors that make agency theory alone insufficient for studying how to motivate professors 
and influence their performance: no wide and significant gap between the interests of 
management and professors exists. 
One suggested improvement of traditional agency theory is behavioral agency theory which 
takes elements from behavioral theories to achieve a more complete framework explaining 
motivation, incentives, and achieving goals. This more holistic approach on work motivation 
will be introduced in the next subchapter. 
3.1.2 Behavioral agency theory 
The advantage of behavioral agency theory is that it combines elements from different 
motivation theories taking human behavior into account (Pepper & Gore, 2012). Examining 
compensation from the human behavior point of view is particularly well justified because 
when ensuring the efficacy of compensation, it is vital to consider the factors that describe, 
drive, and decide our behavior (Steel & König, 2006). The additional value of the theory 
compared to traditional agency theory comes from the consideration of various behavioral 
theories. These theories include elements such as the relationship between extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation and crowding-out theory (e.g. Fehr & Falk, 2002), inequity aversion 
(Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), expectancy-valence theory (Kominis & Emmanuel, 2007), goal-
setting and self-efficacy theories (Locke & Latham, 2002; Bandura, 1994), and the inclusion 
of time-discounting. These elements will be described in this subchapter and in the next 
chapter a motivational framework will be built around these theories. 
Pepper and Gore (2012) formulate an agent’s performance (Pa) as a function of their ability 
(A), motivation (M), and opportunity (O) to perform as follows:         
     (     )    (1) 
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Their main argument is that instead of only considering the abilities and opportunities of an 
agent, their work motivation plays an important role in ensuring the optimal outcome. The 
ability to perform refers to the personal attributes of an agent that enable them to perform the 
tasks (e.g. knowledge and skill) whereas opportunities are the external conditions such as the 
necessary work structures that allow the performance. (Pepper & Gore, 2012.) The agent’s 
motivation to perform, in turn, is something that drives a person to make an effort to achieve a 
goal (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). It is something in between the other two variables: it can 
either be caused by an external cause or derive from inside the agent. 
Motivation theories have long distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation as 
drivers of human behavior. The most common definitions are that extrinsic motivation is 
driven by contingent rewards followed by performing a task (Ryan & Deci, 2000a) while 
intrinsic motivation refers to an individual’s desire to perform for the desirability of a task per 
se (Benabou & Tirole, 2003). There is no doubt that extrinsic motivators, such as basic salary, 
are essential for work motivation to some level. However, the significance of intrinsic 
motivation cannot be neglected when talking about increasing performance levels especially 
with motivated agents, and finding the balance between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation is in 
a key role in the discussion. The importance of stable employment and salary (such as 
tenures), for instance, is usually high when employees possess – or ought to possess – high 
intrinsic motivation, allowing them to form personal associations to the work and co-workers 
(Kreps, 1997). Traditional agency theory does not itself, however, recognize the option that 
extrinsic incentives could lower effort levels but sees them as aligning interests between the 
agent and the principal (ibid.). In behavioral agency theory, this option is acknowledged and 
considered by studying the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. 
Kominis and Emmanuel (2007) found in their study on middle management that the 
motivation and consequently performance were strongly affected by both intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation. This supports the orientation towards considering both extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation when studying performance management and goal-setting. Most of the 
motivation theories do indeed seem to imply that intrinsic motivation is at least as important 
as extrinsic; some scholars emphasize it even more (Benabou & Tirole, 2003). There is also a 
perception that extrinsic motivators might decrease intrinsic motivation (e.g. Deci, 1971; 
Kreps, 1997) – a phenomenon that is also called the crowding-out effect (Frey & Jegen, 
2001). However, for instance Amabile (1993) discovered that extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation can interact positively with each other and thus cause crowding in. It would seem 
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to be the case that extrinsic motivators can either detract from intrinsic motivation and shift it 
towards extrinsic motivation which simultaneously decreases the overall level of motivation; 
or it can enhance overall motivation. The nature of the motivator determines the 
consequences: money seems to decrease intrinsic motivation whereas verbal, positive 
feedback increases it (Deci, 1971; Frey & Jegen, 2001). This is supported by motivation 
crowding theory and the empirical evidence that was found to support the statement (Frey & 
Jegen, 2001).  
Crowding-out theory or motivation crowding theory explains the relationship between 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, as described above, especially when an external extrinsic 
motivator exists. From a psychological perspective, Frey and Jegen (2001) identified two 
processes and two conditions derived from the processes explaining the effect of extrinsic 
motivators on intrinsic motivation: individuals can perceive an external intervention as (1) 
controlling and reducing their self-determination (impaired self-determination) or (2) that 
their motivation is not acknowledged (impaired self-esteem). Self-determination refers to the 
levels in which a person does something without an external interference because they are 
intrinsically motivated, versus the levels in which a person is motivated by external 
motivators (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). Strong self-determination is important for intrinsic 
behavior and therefore creating crowding in requires building conditions that “support one’s 
feelings of competence, autonomy, and relatedness are the basis for one maintaining intrinsic 
motivation and becoming more self-determined with respect to extrinsic motivation”. (ibid.)  
As a consequence of these processes, external interventions perceived as controlling damage 
both self-determination and self-esteem and are thus crowding out intrinsic motivation. On 
the other hand, external interventions can be perceived as supportive which will enhance self-
esteem and enlarge self-determination, and eventually crowding in occurs. Furthermore, Deci 
(1980, p. 217) suggests that peoples’ self-determination could be exploited by emphasizing 
the informative aspect of rewards rather than that of the controlling, i.e. guiding activities 
towards desired performance. However, Fehr and Falk (2002) raise the question that even if 
an external monetary incentive did decrease intrinsic motivation, the overall motivation might 
still be higher than with no monetary incentive at all. Therefore the total effect of the 
incentive and consequently the performance can be positive even if intrinsic motivation did 
decrease; in that case the question would be whether the increase of extrinsic motivation 
amounts to more than the decrease of intrinsic motivation.  
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Referring to the performance function (1) of Pepper and Gore (2012) and the analysis above, 
it would seem that an extrinsic reward system should avoid weakening intrinsic motivation in 
the academia since academics are already considered to have strong intrinsic motivation. The 
motivational impact of extrinsic incentive schemes and rewards might turn negative if they 
consist of incomplete and inaccurate performance measures or if the link to the measured 
performance is not transparent (Kominis & Emmanuel, 2007). When designing an extrinsic 
incentive of performance-based pay scheme for employees possessing high intrinsic 
motivation, they should be communicated as supportive extrinsic interventions so that the 
overall motivation would not decrease. Since intrinsic motivation plays an important role in 
the work of academics, being especially careful with the effects of extrinsic incentives is vital. 
Another component of behavioral agency theory, goal-setting theory (e.g. Locke & Latham, 
2002), indicates that setting challenging goals for individuals, or for groups for that matter 
(Locke & Latham, 2006), without having a corresponding extrinsic reward connected to the 
goal might increase motivation and performance in itself. This theoretical statement is 
strongly supported by empirical research, ninety percent of the studies on the topic supporting 
the results (Locke;Shaw;Saari;& & Latham, 1981). Thereby the goal in itself motivates the 
individual to perform well and the performance is driven by intrinsic motivation. There is also 
a great deal of literature about how to determine the goals in order to foster performance. 
Locke et al. (1981) connect goals to the value gained from achieving the goal and state that 
the value can derive either from intrinsic or from extrinsic motivation, or both – which gets us 
back to the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.   
Goal-setting theory is closely affected by self-efficacy which refers to people’s beliefs about 
their capabilities of performance affecting their lives or goals (Staples;Hulland;& Higgins, 
1998). High self-efficacy interacts with intrinsic interests and motivation: when people have 
high assurance about their own capabilities of performance, their intrinsic interest is fostered 
and they become more engaged in the task (Bandura, 1994). Self-efficacy can be strengthened 
in four ways: (1) through success and mastery experiences; (2) through the example of other 
similar to oneself and social models; (3) through verbal social persuasion; and (4) through 
reducing people’s stress reactions and negative emotional predispositions (Staples et al., 
1998). This would suggest creating an environment where positive experiences of success are 
emphasized and thus the employees’ perceptions of their capabilities would be strengthened 
consequently. One way to do this could be through a reward system that is based on 
exceptional performance and where the reward is perceived as a tribute to exceeding. 
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Another central building block of behavioral agency theory is expectancy-valence theory 
which is based on the idea that employees rationally evaluate workplace behaviors and choose 
those that will most likely lead to outcomes they value the most (Steers;Mowday;& Shapiro, 
2004). Steel and König (2006) compared the process of choosing among actions in the 
traditional expectancy-valence theory to rational gambling. The process is determined by two 
influencing factors: 1) the perceived probability of achieving an outcome (expectancy) and 2) 
the perceived value of the outcome (valence) (Steel & König, 2006).  From here, the 
following, simplified formula can be derived (Kominis & Emmanuel, 2007): 
            (2) 
where the factorial of expectancy (E) and valence (V) equals to motivation (M). Even though 
the formula (2) is quite straightforward, it provides a more comprehensive picture on what 
affects an agent’s motivation. If an organization wants to enhance the overall motivation of its 
employees, it should consider how probable the employee perceives achieving the outcome 
and how they value the expected outcome of certain performance. Setting the desired outcome 
level so that the employee perceives achieving it probable enough, however not too low, has 
therefore a significant influence on the person’s motivation. The outcome can be either the 
direct outcome of performance or an external reward gained from achieving the outcome. If a 
person values the former, they are more intrinsically driven, and in the case of the latter, an 
extrinsic motivator drives performance. 
Inequity aversion is another element of BAT that affects an agent’s work motivation. It was 
first introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) who defined an inequity-averse person as one 
who dislikes outcomes that are perceived inequitable. Hence the idea that people are only 
interested in their personal utility is questioned and a new perspective introduced: that some 
people can be also driven by perceived fairness regarding others. Englmaier and Wambach 
(2010), for instance, found that inequity aversion should affect the incentive structure. They 
argue that an optimal incentive contract balances “the agent's concern for insurance and 
fairness and the principal's desire to provide adequate incentives”. Correspondingly, they 
continue that besides paying more, paying more equitably could also be an effective incentive 
instrument and thus enhance overall motivation. This would seem to be a good fit with the 
university environment consisting of professionals and experts of their field where also the 
evident competitiveness is missing.  
 22  
 
Additionally, the time preferences of an agent affect the overall effects of extrinsic rewards on 
their overall motivation. Time discounting acknowledges that the timing of a reward is an 
influential factor as well. Time has been found to affect the agent’s motivation: people tend to 
favor initiating tasks where the reward is closer in time over those where the reward is more 
distant, even if it was more valuable (Steel & König, 2006). Pepper and Gore (2012) 
acknowledge that the effect of a reward on motivation varies over time, depending on how 
near or far in the future from the performance the reward will be achieved. Thus, the delay in 
getting a reward, especially an extrinsic reward, causes decrease in motivation. This implies 
that in order to create a more effective reward system, the reward should be given close to the 
rewarded action.  
After introducing the elements of BAT above, the following chapter will link work motivation 
and professors as well as create a motivational framework to support the analysis of overall 
rewarding in this study. 
3.1.3 Work motivation of academics 
Even though motivation theories are general in nature and have been applied to organizations 
with different contexts, academics as professionals have a few distinctive features in their 
work motivation (Miner, 1980). What comes to the performance function (1) in the academic 
world, the assumption usually is that professors possess the required abilities since they chose 
an academic career and that they have sufficient motivation to use their abilities (ibid.). This 
would suggest that as long as they have enough resources, their performance is near to 
optimal. Consequently, it can be argued whether professors’ motivation and correspondingly 
performance can be increased by NPM practices such as rewarding and whether there is a 
negative effect from using them. 
A general assumption is that professors possess high intrinsic motivation towards their work. 
Even though there are different perceptions in academic literature, study findings exist that 
especially tenured faculty members are principally intrinsically motivated to do research 
(Chen et al., 2006). Furthermore, Lee (2001) also found that faculty members’ teaching 
motivation is intrinsically driven. This implies that professors can, indeed, be treated as 
motivated agents as was assumed in Chapter 3.1.1 and consequently the need for goal 
alignment between the agent and the principal is smaller. It also suggests that it is justified to 
use tenures while they were found to fit well with organizations where employees are strongly 
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driven by intrinsic motivation. Tenure, in turn, maintains the environment fostering intrinsic 
motivation, which leads to a positive circle of strong intrinsic motivation.   
If professors are assumed to have high intrinsic motivation in the first place, it can be asked 
whether their overall motivation can be affected positively by establishing extrinsic 
motivators such as performance-based incentives or other pay. Pfeffer and Lawler (1980) 
studied the connection between an individual’s commitnment to an organization and extrinsic 
rewards in university and college faculties. They found indications that extrinsic rewards 
would be less effective for individuals whose behavioral commitment to the organization is 
strong. As commitment is supported by tenures, it could be assessed whether tenure creates an 
environment where extrinsic rewards do not have a significant meaning in professors’ 
motivation. In addition, there is a danger with extrinsic rewards in universities that the 
negative effects of crowding-out theory – impaired self-determination and impaired self-
esteem – emerge and the professors feel controlled and that their motivation is understated. If 
this is the case, the main source of professors’ motivation, intrinsic motivation, will most 
likely decrease as a consequence of the crowding-out effect. 
In order to avoid the crowding-out effect, organizations should establish extrinsic motivators 
which professors perceive as supportive and informative rather than controlling. This can 
partly be done by choosing the form of the motivator carefully, but correct communication 
plays at least as important a role as the chosen motivators. While professors are considered to 
have high intrinsic motivation and be self-determined (Lee, 2001), external control should 
offer some loose limits and guidelines but provide freedom within the limits simultaneously. 
This way they could be encouraged to perform the desired activities without losing the feeling 
that their work and performance is self-determined – i.e. the external intervention would be 
supportive. Similarly, the informative aspect should be emphasized: these issues are 
important; it is hoped that they are paid attention to at work, and by doing that, a valued 
outcome will be accomplished. 
Combining self-efficacy and goal-setting theories, high intrinsic motivation possessed by 
professors may on the other hand be partly because of their high beliefs about their 
capabilities while professors are presumably extremely competent in their field. With high 
intrinsic motivation, properly defined goals will stimulate performance. Similarly, goals can 
be used as a means to enhance self-efficacy, for example by highlighting the person’s success 
when achieving their goals or by highlighting the example of others when they achieve them 
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(Staples et al., 1998). This will eventually lead to higher intrinsic motivation according to 
self-efficacy theory, which underlines the effect of pre-determined goals as a motivation 
driver. In addition, achieving goals can be combined with extrinsic rewards; however, the 
rewards should again be perceived as supportive and informative rather than controlling so 
that the effect on intrinsic motivation is not diminished. 
Figure 2 shows the motivational framework for public sector organizations at a general level, 
derived from behavioral agency theory (Pepper & Gore, 2012). The framework is built around 
the performance formula (1) within a university context, the elements of the formula (agent’s 
motivation, opportunities, and abilities that result in the agent’s work performance) forming 
the essence of the framework. They are marked in thicker circles and arrows, and the arrows 
indicate that performance is eventually a consequence of these three elements. Agent’s 
motivation is further divided into extrinsic and intrinsic motivation as has been defined before 
and the two-sided arrow symbolizes the crowding-in and crowding-out relationships between 
these two types of motivations. 
In addition to these elements, organization’s goals and agent’s goals are part of the basic 
structure in the framework, affecting the agent’s extrinsic and intrinsic motivation 
respectively. The relationship between agent’s goals and intrinsic motivation is derived from 
goal-setting theory, according to which the agent’s goals interact with intrinsic motivation 
(Locke & Latham, 2006). Furthermore, it is assumed that organization’s goals are 
communicated to the agent by using NPM practices and that the practices affect the agent’s 
extrinsic motivation by creating external interventions. In an ideal case, these two goals 
would be very close to each other; this would be a situation where the interests of the  
 
Figure 2: Motivational framework in public sector organizations 
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principal and the agent were as aligned as possible. This often is the case in universities at the 
macro level because of academic leadership, at least more than in private sector organizations. 
However, there are most likely differences at the micro level and establishing external 
rewards is one way to decrease the differences between the goals. 
In addition to the core elements of the framework, I included other, contextual factors that 
influence these elements. Since they are not in the essence of the framework, the relationships 
between them and the core elements are marked with thinner arrows. These factors include 
the organization’s strategy as well as different legislations and regulations that influence the 
organization’s goals. Furthermore, the agent’s perceptions about their capabilities (self-
efficacy) and self-determination affect the agent’s intrinsic motivation. Finally, inequity 
aversion has an influence on extrinsic motivation through the perceived fairness of extrinsic 
incentives (Bandura, 1994; Ryan & Deci, 2000b; Englmaier & Wambach, 2010) and 
consequently on intrinsic motivation through motivation crowding. 
The motivational framework will serve as a basis of the analysis as well as a context against 
which reward systems are reflected in the next chapter. The analysis will focus on how to 
affect the agent’s motivation rather than the opportunities and abilities since the latter are not 
under the direct influence of rewarding. 
3.2 Reward systems  
Employee reward systems are an important part of motivating employees to perform 
according to the organization’s strategy (Lawler & Jenkins, 1992). They are part of the overall 
management control system package (Malmi & Brown, 2008) and can consist of various 
elements such as monetary rewards
5
, non-monetary rewards
6
 (Bartol & Srivastava, 2002), and 
career
7
 (Hsieh & Chen, 2011). A reward system can be defined to consist of everything 
employees receive from their employer in return to their work performance (Hsieh & Chen, 
2011). There are several ways to organize reward systems, starting from what the 
organization wants to achieve with them to how the processes and the structures related to the 
reward system are built. In the following, I will go through the objectives of reward systems 
as well as how to structure them. Finally, I will conclude the use of rewarding as a NPM 
practice in order to motivate university professors and steer their performance.  
                                                 
5
 Monetary rewards can be e.g. base pay, long-term and short-term bonuses or merit-based salary increase 
6
 Non-monetary rewards include elements such as awards and verbal recognition 
7
 Career opportunities can consist of e.g. training, career opportunities, and development 
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3.2.1 Objectives of rewarding 
In most cases, two basic elements of a reward system are a fixed base pay and a variable, 
performance-based element. The latter is a common pay element in one form or another 
especially in corporate organizations. The following objectives are often mentioned with 
regard to variable pay: to give direction to employee performance and motivate employees 
towards the intended goals (Henri, 2006). The former indicates that through variable 
incentives, organizations can communicate their goals and what is perceived important to 
employees and that way steer their actions towards wanted performance. Similarly, by 
offering rewards for achieving the communicated goals, organizations can offer extrinsic 
motivators for employees to strive for these goals. These two objectives often go hand in hand 
in organizations. 
Linked to the first objective mentioned above, performance-based rewards are an important 
management accounting tool in formulating the organization’s strategy to employees and 
consequently implementing it. They play a central role in giving signals to individuals about 
what is important and about the strategic direction towards which individuals are expected to 
perform. (Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 2003.) When management wants to steer employees 
through rewarding, they have to keep in mind that monetary incentives or performance-based 
pay should not be perceived as controlling but rather informing (ibid.) or supportive instead. 
Otherwise the effects of the reward might have a performance-steering effect but at the same 
time decrease intrinsic motivation. Therefore one should be careful with how the incentive 
system is communicated especially in professional organizations where employees highly 
value freedom. When they are perceived more as informing, i.e. providing information about 
the goals and strategic objectives, employees feel that they maintain their personal control 
over their work and the potential decreasing effect on intrinsic motivation through impaired 
self-determination is far less powerful. 
Another danger of using rewarding as a performance-steering tool is that some parts of 
performance might be ignored even though they were essential for the organization (Baker et 
al., 1988). This might be because those actions are not easily quantified or their meaning is 
not acknowledged by the management. The sentence “what you measure is what you’ll get” 
(Ariely, 2010) is often used in connection with performance management: the attention is 
focused on those issues that are measured and communicated and they get conducted more 
easily. This is connected to agency theory: the agent might either deliberately improve the 
measured indicators or unconsciously focus only on the tasks that are communicated through 
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rewarding. Correspondingly, what is not measured often gets less attention and might even be 
completely neglected. 
The second way how rewarding can be used as a management control tool is to provide 
external motivators to employees for specific performance by rewarding for desired 
outcomes. This follows the logic that an agent’s motivation is influencing their performance: 
the more motivated they are, the better they perform. As was explained earlier in the chapter, 
how the agent perceives extrinsic rewards has a significant meaning: if they are perceived as 
controlling, the motivational effects are negative but with supportive external rewards, a 
positive motivational effect is possible. In order to build a reward system that creates external 
motivators with positive effects on overall motivation, the motivational framework introduced 
in Chapter 3.1.3 (Figure 2) plays an important role: by linking different components of 
rewarding to the motivational effects, a better connection between rewarding and performance 
outcomes can be drawn. In the following, overall rewarding is viewed from a more practical 
point of view: what can be regarded as part of a reward system and how it can be constructed 
in order to motivate and steer employees. 
3.2.2 Different ways of rewarding 
Lawler (1993) distinguishes two dimensions in reward systems: they have a process and a 
structural feature. By processes he means the communication and decision processes linked to 
the reward system, in other words the way reward systems are designed and administered, and 
the structural dimension refers to the formal mechanisms, procedures, and practices through 
which the rewarding is executed (Lawler, 1993), i.e. how to construct overall rewarding. 
While processes (e.g. how to communicate the system to employees) are important in 
implementing the reward system, this study will focus on how to build an effective reward 
system for knowledge workers. Hence, the focus of this study is on the structural elements 
and consequently the structural dimension will be in the focus of this chapter. 
Often the starting point of building the structure for rewarding is to determine the base pay 
(Lawler & Jenkins, 1992). If an organization wants to reward performance on top of that, the 
method by which the performance dimension is taken into account should be decided. In 
practice, most organizations have both fixed and variable compensation elements, the latter 
usually being performance-related (Van Herpen, van Praag, & Cools, 2005). Rewarding for 
performance is perceived as a way of acknowledging those that make more effort for the 
organization and providing incentive to perform towards the organizational goals. In addition, 
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most organizations want to create a motivational effect by performance-based pay and this 
way improve performance. There are two common ways to link pay to performance: a merit 
system and an incentive, or a bonus, system (Lawler & Jenkins, 1992).  
In a merit pay system, salary increases are given according to the employee’s performance. 
However, companies often have difficulties in clearly linking the pay to performance and the 
pay is often subjectively determined by the employee’s supervisor (Heneman & Cohen, 
1988). In this case, the attempt to motivate staff with the merit system turns out to be less 
effective. Thus, if an organization wants to motivate through merit increase, the increase 
should be clearly and transparently linked to performance and the linkage must be done ex 
ante, i.e. the goals must be determined beforehand and the individual has to be aware of them. 
In order to communicate what the management wants from the employees with respect to 
their performance, they have to be careful when designing the merit system. If they want to 
gain the desired effects, defining the desired performance and how to determine whether it 
was gained or not has to be done thoroughly. Van Herpen et al. (2003) found that career 
concerns, e.g. promotion opportunities, have an impact on both intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation, especially when alternative possibilities for salary increases do not exist. This 
would indicate that either a transparent and fair promotion system or a merit increase system 
provides an important incentive device for employees. 
Incentive pay, on the other had, is often a more direct way to link pay to performance and it 
has been found to have also a more direct effect on motivation than merit pay in corporations 
(Lawler, 1993). In incentive systems, the variable, performance-based pay is determined from 
time period to time period and it can vary notably depending on the employee’s performance 
within each period. The basis for determining the bonus is often objective and alike for each 
employee (ibid.). Incentive systems have found to match some organizations better than 
others, depending on the nature of the work. They often work better in organizations with 
outcomes that can be comprehensively measured and relatively stable nature of the work 
(Gerhart;Milkovich;& & Murray, 1992; Lawler & Jenkins, 1993). For instance, a production 
company might meet these requirements but in knowledge-intensive organizations like 
universities where the employees rather than the processes create most of the value, bonus 
systems might face challenges. In such contexts, the multidimensionality of work and outputs 
that are difficult to quantify make it more difficult to create a fair incentive system. 
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Besides the base salary and performance-based elements, total rewarding can consist of other 
forms of rewarding as well. For instance, well-performing individuals or teams can be 
recognized by other means than monetary bonuses or merit increases. Other recognition can 
be e.g. awards (Employee of the Year etc.), making extraordinary achievements visible 
through communication, or small monetary prizes. Lawler (1993), for instance, suggests that 
if an organization’s success is dependent on both individual performance excellence and 
group work, “it may make sense to focus at least some of the reward system on recognizing 
outstanding individual performance”. Kalleberg (1977), additionally, classifies adequate 
resources as a job reward as well. He argues that adequate resources such as equipment, 
authority, and information required for job performance are of a concern for employees and 
affect the final performance. Thus, if the resources are not sufficient, it may cause frustration 
amongst employees and consequently decrease their motivation and performance. While 
some might not see providing adequate resources for employees as a reward, it might have a 
motivational effect on others through to the increased freedom of work they provide for 
employees, for instance (Kalleberg, 1977). 
An alternative to rewarding the performance of an individual is a group-based incentive. A 
group-based inventive could be a possibility when work performance is dependent on the 
performance of several people, a group, and when the contribution of an individual employee 
to the actual output is difficult to measure (Hansen, 1997). There are a few options how group 
performance is taken into account: an individual may have a group dimension in their 
performance appraisal, the whole team might be rewarded for their good performance, or an 
employee can be rewarded for organizational performance, which is an indirect way of 
rewarding for group performance (Lawler, 2003). Hansen (1997) found that group incentives 
increased the average performance level within the studied units by improving the 
performance of initially lower performers. However, group-based incentives may cause a free 
rider problem but when designed properly, they potentially increase an individual’s 
performance (Hansen, 1997; London & Oldham, 1977). Lawler (2003) argues that “rewarding 
the team as a whole will lead to more knowledge development and sharing than will 
rewarding individuals”. It is also logical to deduce that inequity averse persons would 
appreciate this type of rewarding while the entire group gets a reward for an outcome they 
have achieved together. 
Also the degree of centralization of the reward system is a relevant question what comes to 
multidimensional organizations. In these organizations it has to be decided which elements of 
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rewarding are determined at which level of the organization and how the decision power is 
distributed. When rewarding is centralized, the reward practices are similar for employees 
throughout the organization and the pay processes are standardized whereas in a decentralized 
system smaller units are responsible for the design and administration of rewarding (Lawler, 
1993). Both have their advantages, the former being able to exploit the administrative 
expertise at the central level (ibid.) and the latter being able to better consider the unit-specific 
differences and features (Gomez‐Mejia, 1992). A decentralized system seems to fit especially 
organizations which have multiple units that differ significantly from each other. The 
centralization level can also be something in between these two extreme cases, having some 
centrally determined guidelines or principles in the frames of which the lower units can 
determine their own systems.  
3.2.3 Reward systems in universities 
Universities are strongly knowledge-based organizations. They differ significantly from 
traditional production organizations where individuals are not the key competitive advantage. 
Because human capital is vital for them, Lawler (2003) states that reward systems used in 
traditional production organizations are not optimal for knowledge-based organizations. He 
suggests that instead of determining an employee’s pay by their jobs and positions, it would 
be better to reward knowledge workers according to the person. In addition, rewarding for 
performance has been found to motivate employees to perform better (Lawler & Jenkins, 
1992). This would suggest using a base salary determined by the person and including a 
system that includes performance in rewarding. This can be done, as stated before, in two 
different ways: either by implementing an incentive pay system or by having a merit pay 
system. 
As often is the case in knowledge-based organizations (Mohrman, 2003), academic work is 
multidimensional in nature (Blaxter et al., 1998). Academics have a number of tasks they are 
expected to perform, including conducting and publishing research in scientific books, 
journals, and conferences; teaching and supervising thesis and doctoral students; community 
involvement; networking; and engaging in administrative tasks (Nir and Zilberstein-Levy, 
2006; Blaxter et al. 1998). In Finland, for instance, the expectations for what the academics 
are supposed to do originate already from the Universities Act and the other regulations that 
concern the performance of universities. However, despite the number of different tasks that 
are included in the academic work description, academics are expected to achieve excellent 
performance and fulfil the high standards that are set to them (Nir & Zilberstein-Levy, 2006). 
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Objective, performance-based elements of rewarding often take the multidimensionality into 
account by including measures reflecting different dimensions in the system, and in practice 
they are often designed to at least consider the different dimensions and tasks. 
Despite the attempts to include different dimensions in them, incentive systems turn easily 
inefficient when the nature of work is multidimensional (Kallio, 2014). When all the 
dimensions are tried to be taken into account, there is a danger that reward systems often 
become extremely complex and transparency suffers. While the performance dimension is, in 
practice, often rewarded through an incentive system, incentive structures tend to become too 
complex and lose their motivating and steering effect as a result. In addition, 
multidimensionality connected to incentive schemes often increases game playing (Dixit, 
2002). As plenty of previous research has concluded, this would suggest that incentive 
systems would not be the most efficient way to organize and manage professors’ work. 
Furthermore, there are indications that reward structures in universities often tend to have 
failed to create incentives that maintain commitment and hard work (Bess, 1998).  
Especially when the structures become complex and limiting, introducing NPM practices 
might cause frustration amongst professors expecting a certain level of academic freedom. 
Academic freedom refers to the freedom of a scholar to do research and teaching without 
having to fear punishment or termination of employment (Berdahl, 1990). Whilst being 
professionals and experts in their respective fields, Berdahl (1990) argues that procedural 
interventions, such as pre-audits, can be counter-productive. He discussed academic freedom 
at a university level, but the same argument would seem to apply at an individual level as 
well. Because professors are used to a certain level of autonomy in their work, NPM practices 
can easily be seen controlling and as an attempt to limit their freedom. On that account, 
reward structures should allow a certain level of freedom in an individual professor’s work 
and try not to destroy the feeling of autonomy. This would support the use of supportive 
rather than controlling extrinsic rewards, which would also allow the professors to manage the 
multiple dimensions of their work independently and therefore support their self-
determination (Deci, 1980). 
Besides being multidimensional, professors’ work is more long-term in nature, especially 
what comes to research. This creates challenges for rewarding since, due to the time-
discounting effect, instant rewards are found to be more effective than rewards given after a 
longer period of time from the actual performance (Steel and König, 2006). Consequently, 
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there is a contradiction between the nature of the work and the effectiveness of rewards: 
because the final output is influenced by work from a longer period of time, it is often 
impossible to give immediate rewards. This, consequently, decreases the effects of the 
reward. In addition, yearly performance-based rewarding can hardly be optimal for work the 
results of which are seen after years of groundwork. Consequently, rewarding in universities 
faces the challenge of balancing these two time horizons.  
Universities have had problems with reward systems and especially with connecting incentive 
scheme to the quality of performance (Kallio, 2014). One of the central problems is related to 
the quality and quantity of their work, for instance research papers: while some professors 
produce a great number of research papers with little significance, some professors might 
publish very few papers with a greater scientific contribution (Cole & Cole, 1967). The 
problem is related to the phenomenon that in the academic world, the quality of work is 
generally valued higher than the quantity, at least what comes to research. However, there is a 
contradiction between this idea and for instance the Funding Model of universities in Finland 
that was discussed above: the Funding Model and often also the compensation systems in 
universities encourage professors to publish more in quantities instead of better quality 
research and the measures are quantitative in nature rather than qualitative (Kallio, 2014). 
One way to regard the qualitative aspect of work is to include holistic, subjective measures 
and assessment in rewarding. By the use of subjectivity in evaluation, any other relevant 
information that arises outside formal, objective measures can be taken into account 
(Gibbs;Merchant;van der Stede;& Vargus, 2004). This way the problems of complex 
calculation models or some work aspects being neglected can be bypassed. It would be 
reasonable to include a subjective element in the performance-based evaluation in universities 
since it is often impossible to acknowledge all the features of work with quantitative measures 
without complicating the system too much. However, subjective performance evaluation has 
its problems. For instance, it requires trust between the employee and the superior who is 
conducting the evaluation (ibid.) so that the outcome would not be based on any other than 
performance-related matters.  
In addition to the professors’ work being multidimensional, universities as organizations have 
multiple dimensions as well. They are often divided into different units and levels (i.e. 
schools, faculties, and departments) and these levels have their own administration, at least to 
some extent. (Clark, 1998.) Therefore, the question of centralization of rewarding is relevant 
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with regard to what is decided at the university level as a whole and how much flexibility, 
decision power, and freedom is given to which organizational level. In order to exploit the 
administrative knowledge at the central level and align the subunits strategically, some level 
of centralization is beneficial. However, different schools and departments can be very 
different from each other in terms of focus areas, research, teaching practices, and other 
elements of work, and as with multidimensional organizations in general, these differences 
can best be considered with unit-specific measures or elements of rewarding (Gomez‐Mejia, 
1992). Hence it would be justified to allow some level of decentralization to avoid 
generalizing too much. 
Besides the centralization level, the unit that is subject to rewarding should be specified. 
While research in universities is often conducted in research groups (Sutton & Bergerson, 
2001), giving a performance-based reward only to the professor in the group might seem 
inequitable to the other members of it. In this case, one possibility could be giving a mutual 
reward to the research group in order to decrease the inequitability (Kalleberg, 1977), for 
instance a recognition type of a reward or allowing them with more resources. This would be 
in line with the controllability of outcomes as well: the group as a whole controls the final 
outcome rather than an individual in most cases, and therefore the controlling unit would also 
receive the reward. On the other hand, another option could be that all of the individual 
members of the team could be rewarded based on the group’s performance (Lawler, 2003). 
In general, there is a lot of literature on how to design an incentive system or performance-
related pay in order it to have a positive effect on performance. Transparency and fairness of 
the system are often emphasized (Van Herpen et al., 2005), and ter Bogt and Scapens (2012) 
emphasize transparency as an essential feature of NPM. Transparency can be delivered 
through communication and by avoiding complexity in the system, whereas fairness regarding 
the size of the compensation can be relative to either the principal or other employees (ibid.). 
Kauhanen and Piekkola (2006) found in their study that performance pay has motivational 
effects if employees are able to affect the outcomes of the measures (controllability of the 
measures), the organizational level included in the system is not far from the employee so that 
the target remains motivating, employees are familiar with the measures, they participate in 
the design process of the system, and the pay is perceived high enough.  
Figure 3 presents a more specific motivational framework for university context based on the 
framework in Figure 2. Here, the framework is more specified: the organization is limited to  
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Figure 3: Motivational framework for university context 
 
universities and professors are the agents of the situation. Furthermore, NPM is more 
specifically limited to rewarding which is in the focus of this study. Therefore, rewarding is 
the practice by which the university’s goals are communicated to the professor and by which 
the professor’s extrinsic motivation is influenced. Figure 3 shows how the objectives of 
rewarding are linked to the performance formula (1): the university can use it as means to 
influence professors’ extrinsic motivation and eventually guide their performance towards its 
goals. 
All in all, most of the literature about rewarding agrees that employee reward systems should 
be designed to fit the organizational context and strategy. Besides that, employees should 
perceive rewards as valuable if rewarding is used to motivate them towards wanted 
performance (Lawler & Jenkins, 1992): if they do not value the reward, it most likely will not 
affect their motivation positively. This is consistent with expectancy-valence theory which 
states that one of the factors affecting motivation is the expected valence of the outcome 
followed by certain performance. This notion makes it important to find out what are the 
types of rewards that the organization’s employees value and appreciate and align the 
measures with the organization’s strategy in order to have the wanted outcomes. 
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4 CASE ORGANIZATION, RESEARCH METHODS, AND DATA  
The aim of this study is to evaluate the existing reward system for Full Professors at Aalto 
University and, moreover, to develop a proposal for a new university-wide system. Using 
motivation theories to approach rewarding in this particular situation is justified because the 
effects of extrinsic motivators on professors’ intrinsic motivation seem to be a crucial 
question when designing a new reward system. Since professors are found to be intrinsically 
driven, their performance is likely to be affected by the relationship between extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation. In addition, NPM connects rewarding with the academic world and gives 
a background why a reward system might fail in motivating professors. 
This thesis is a part of a project that aims at developing a new incentive system as a part of the 
overall rewarding at Aalto University. The project team consists of one professor from each 
of the six schools of Aalto, two HR representatives and the author of this thesis as a student 
member. The empirical chapters of this study will cover the description of the current 
systems; the analysis of the empirical data based on a survey and theme interviews; and the 
proposal for the new system. In this chapter, I will first introduce the case organization, Aalto 
University, and then the methods used in the empirical research. Finally, I will describe the 
data used in the research.  
4.1 Aalto University 
Aalto University (Aalto) is one of the newest universities in the Finnish higher education 
field. It was formed in a merger of three universities from different fields of science: 
University of Art and Design Helsinki, Helsinki School of Economics, and Helsinki 
University of Technology. The idea of Aalto University is to form an interdisciplinary 
platform for innovation by bringing together people from the different disciplines: design, 
technology, and business (Myllyoja, 2008). Hence, the emphasis of the university is on 
innovation, top research and teaching, as well as internalization. The university started its 
operations in the beginning of 2010 as a foundation-based university, which was enabled by 
the new Universities Act that allowed universities to take a foundation form instead of being 
public institutions. 
As said, three universities from different academic fields formed Aalto University. On the 
basis of the merged universities, there are six different schools in Aalto University: School of  
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Table 1: Schools and Departments in Aalto University 
 The schools and their departments in Aalto University in August, 2014 (Aalto University, 2014b). 
 School Departments 
 
ARTS Architecture 
Art 
Design 
Media 
Film, Television and Scenography 
 
BIZ Accounting 
Economics 
Finance 
Information and Service Economy 
Management Studies 
Marketing 
 
CHEM Biotechnology and Chemical Technology 
Chemistry 
Materials Science and Engineering 
Forest Products Technology 
 
ELEC Electrical Engineering and Automation 
Micro- and Nanosciences 
Radio Science and Engineering 
Signal Processing and Acoustics 
Communications and Networking 
 
ENG Energy Technology 
Engineering Design and Production 
Real Estate, Planning and Geoinformatics 
Civil and Structural Engineering 
Applied Mechanics 
Civil and Environmental Engineering 
 
SCI Biomedical Engineering and Computational Science 
Mathematics and Systems Analysis 
Media Technology 
Applied Physics 
Information and Computer Science 
Computer Science and Engineering 
Industrial Engineering and Management 
 
Arts, Design and Architecture (ARTS); School of Business (BIZ); and four schools that were 
previously part of Helsinki School of Technology: School of Chemical Technology (CHEM), 
School of Electrical Engineering (ELEC), School of Engineering (ENG), and School of 
Science (SCI). The schools have different characteristics with respect to each other: they 
differ in terms of their focus areas, size, and cooperation with the industry, to mention some. 
Table 1 shows the different schools and their departments in order to give an overview of the 
academic fields in the university. 
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Aalto University School of Arts, Design and Architecture has a long tradition in teaching arts 
and active participation in Finnish cultural life as well as strong cooperation with international 
academic and corporate contacts (Heimonen, 2011). ARTS has a strong focus on being an 
international unit (One of Finland’s most international schools, 2012) with long experience in 
multidisciplinary work, which coincides with the whole university’s strategy. It has also a 
very differing profile from the other schools of Aalto focusing on artistic activities such as 
architecture, media, design, and filming. In Aalto-level thinking, artistic activities are 
paralleled with research and even though the process of assessing the quality of artistic 
activities is slightly different from that of research, the logic is similar: the quality is 
eventually assessed by peer reviews. Furthermore, compared to the other schools, ARTS 
acquires less external funding per professor than the others but it has the second most 
undergraduate and graduate students per professor of the six schools. 
Aalto School of Business, in turn, is responsible for the business teaching in the university. 
The school has traditionally had strong relations with the business community and Finnish 
society while, naturally, many of the research projects are related to the corporate world. 
(Helsinki School of Economics history, 2014.) BIZ also has a high number of undergraduates 
and graduates per professor relative to the other schools and quite similarly to ARTS, the 
amount of external funding, whether it was national, international, or partner funding, is 
relatively low compared to the other schools. With respect to the other schools, BIZ had the 
highest number of Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in 2013 but the second lowest amount of 
Doctoral degrees (Table 2), which might be an indicator of a stronger practical orientation. 
Helsinki University of Technology has experienced major changes administratively since the 
merger of the three universities. The biggest change that faced the University of Technology  
 
Table 2: Number of degrees in Aalto University 
The number of Bachelor’s, Master’s and Doctoral Degrees in Aalto University in 2013 (Aalto University, 2014a). 
 School 
Bachelor's 
Degrees 
Master's 
Degrees 
Doctoral 
Degrees 
ARTS 188 264 17 
BIZ 411 457 20 
CHEM 135 136 25 
ELEC 219 199 50 
ENG 345 317 26 
SCI 255 241 91 
Total 1553 1614 229 
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concerns the division of previously one university into four separate Aalto University schools 
following the earlier faculty division. In addition, the Department of Architecture was moved 
under ARTS within the merger. The schools have shared the same administration in the past 
but have anyhow differing profiles from each other, some having more cooperation and 
research projects with the Finnish industry and some being more focused on pure research. 
For instance, ELEC, ENG, and CHEM have acquired significantly more funding from 
partners per professor than the other schools. There are also differences with the number of 
students and the number of ECTS per professor between the technical schools. Especially 
ELEC and SCI had a high number of Doctoral degrees in 2013 (Table 2), perhaps signaling 
for a stronger research orientation or larger research groups. 
The structural changes following the merger into Aalto University have been major and they 
are still going on: the major change to be implemented in the coming years is the move of the 
bachelor-level teaching of the Schools of Arts, Design, and Architecture and the School of 
Business to the main campus in Otaniemi (Aalto University News, 2012). The changes are 
related to the effort to further integrate the schools and to strengthen the cooperation and 
interdisciplinary actions within the university. The integration is also related to the attempt to 
create a university-wide reward system and thereby bring the different schools closer to each 
other administratively as well. However, more administration has been brought in due to the 
structural changes, which has frustrated many professors in the university. 
Since the focus of this study is on professors’ rewarding in Aalto University, it is appropriate 
to review the profiles of the professors in the university. There are six different types of 
professors in Aalto: Full Professors, Associate Professors, Assistant Professors (1
st
 and 2
nd
 
term), Professors of Practice (PoPs), and Aalto Distinguished Professors. Figure 4 shows the 
professors’ tenure track and how the different positions relate to each other. It can be seen that 
there are two basic career steps for tenured professors at the moment: the promotion to the 
Associate Professor position and therefore getting tenured, and the promotion to Full 
Professor. Furthermore, PoPs are appointed from outside the tenure track. Table 3 presents 
how the professors are spread to different positions in each of the schools and in the whole 
university. As can be seen, Full Professors form the majority of the positions at all the other 
schools except ARTS, that is from 58 % to 76 % of all the professors in each school, 63 % on 
average. In ARTS, Professors of Practice are better represented than at the other schools, 
mostly because of the practical and art-oriented nature of the school.  
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Figure 4: Aalto Tenure Track 
The Tenure Track and its steps in Aalto University in 2014 (Aalto University, 2014c). 
 
Table 3: Distribution of professors by positions in Aalto University 
The distribution of professors by positions in the different schools and Aalto University in January 2014 (Aalto University, 
2014). 
  ARTS BIZ CHEM ELEC ENG SCI Total 
Appointed professors in total 42 62 41 52 50 98 348 
Full Professors 18 36 31 33 38 63 219 
Associate Professors (tenured) 2 6 1 5 3 10 28 
Associate Professors (fixed-term) 4 2 2 7 3 4 22 
Assistant Professors (2nd term) 1 5 1 7 0 10 24 
Assistant Professors (1st term) 1 13 2 0 4 7 29 
Professors of Practice 16 0 4 0 2 1 23 
 
4.2 Methods and Justification 
As the research will examine a management accounting phenomenon in a specific context and 
organization, it will be a qualitative case research. While the theory gives a local description 
and explanation (Vaivio, 2008), the empirical research will reflect and be analysed in the 
context of the literature review. Furthermore, since the analysis will concentrate on a specific 
organization, the method of the study will be a case study (Aaltio-Marjosola, 1999). A case 
study is focused on understanding the dynamics within a single setting  (Eisenhardt, 1989b), 
which is also the focus of this study: how is rewarding implemented in the specific case 
organization, Aalto University, and what would an appropriate reward system for that 
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organization be? A benefit of a case study method in accounting is that it reflects the nature of 
a management accounting phenomenon in practice (Scapens, 1990).  
A case study can have an action-analytical, nomothetical, or constructive approach, for 
instance (Kasanen et al., 1993). In this study, the constructive approach is used as one of the 
objectives of the study is to design a proposal for the basis of the new reward system at Aalto 
University. In a constructive research in management accounting the focus is on realistic 
managerial issues and problems and the goal is to create an innovative solution for the 
problem(s). According to Kasanen et al. (1993), a successful constructive research provides a 
solution for a real-world problem with a theoretical connection as well as an analysis of how 
well it can potentially be generalized. The thesis will also have descriptive features in addition 
to the solution being normative (Lukka, 1991) while the current incentive system and the 
opinions about it are described and evaluated. However, the description serves for the 
purposes of the construction since the suggestion for the new model is the main outcome. 
To derive the descriptions used as a basis for the new model, two main methods are used to 
complement each other: a survey and theme interviews. Such method triangulation has been 
an increasing trend in management accounting, and many researchers use quantitative 
methods to support and validate the findings of qualitative methods (Modell, 2005). In this 
research, the survey method was chosen because it was found to be the most efficient way to 
gather data from the target group most comprehensively. In addition, the interviews bring 
more insight into the existing compensation system and how it is perceived within the 
organization as well as opinions about what kind of a system would motivate professors the 
most. The interviews are executed as theme interviews, which is a type of a semi-structured 
interview where the themes are pre-set but the order and emphasis are dependent of each 
interview and context (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008). The survey and the interviews are used to 
gather longitudinal data since the aim is to get information about the opinions about incentive 
systems and the theoretical issues connected to them at a given moment across the 
organization (Aaltio-Marjosola, 1999).  
The population of the empirical research consists of tenured university professors. In this 
research, as is typical for case studies, the population is approached through one organization, 
in this case Aalto University. The sample consists of professors in all of the schools in Aalto 
University. It is appropriate for the empirical objectives of this thesis while the new reward 
system applies to Aalto professors. In addition, it is in line with the general objective of a case 
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study: to understand the dynamics within a single setting (Aaltio-Marjosola, 1999). The 
survey was thus targeted to all the professors at Aalto University, including full professors as 
well as associate and assistant professors and professors of practice. As the main target group 
consists of Full Professors who are at the highest level of their career steps, some of the 
respondents did not fall into this category. However, in order to improve the reliability of the 
results and get a larger sample, other types of professors were included as well.  
4.3 Data and data collection 
The data used in the research consists mostly of a survey targeted to all professors at Aalto as 
well as ten theme interviews. These are the main methods used in the research and they will 
be described in more detail in chapters 4.3.1 and 4.3.2; however, some supplementary data 
was used as well in order to gain a more comprehensive image of the situation and opinions. 
Since the thesis is connected to the project as explained at the beginning of Chapter 4, 
materials from the project team meetings were used as data in this study. The team met on 
regular basis during 2014, approximately once every two months and the meetings were 
principally a platform for brainstorming about rewarding and the incentive system and for 
developing the new model based on the data gathered in this thesis. The project team’s 
meeting schedule can be seen in Figure 5. The meetings were often prior to Aalto board 
meetings to which material of the progress was delivered. A discussion memo was written 
based on each meeting and the memos were used as a supportive material for the empirical 
research. Additionally, other university-specific material such as email discussions about 
incentive systems prior to the project and descriptive materials regarding rewarding at Aalto 
University were utilized. These materials will be used to get an overview of the current and 
former incentive systems, opinions about them, and an overview of overall rewarding. 
Figure 5: Progress of the empirical data collection 
The timeline of the empirical data collection process. 
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Other data that was used besides the materials from the meetings and the memos consists 
mainly of internal HR data regarding the schools, some email discussions between professors 
prior to the project regarding the current incentive system, and other HR material about the 
current and the former incentive systems.  
4.3.1 Survey 
As said, the main sources of the data used in the empirical research consist of a survey and 
theme interviews. The survey (see Appendix 1) was created in cooperation with the project 
team members and it was made both with the empirical need in mind and based on previous 
literature as well as the strategy of Aalto University. It consisted of questions regarding 
potential rewarding elements and criteria used for evaluation in order to find out what the 
professors find important and functional in rewarding. Furthermore, the behavioral agency 
theory served as a basis for the motivational and work-related questions.  
The survey was divided into four parts: the first page consisted of questions regarding the 
professors’ perceptions about rewarding and incentive systems in general and more 
specifically; the second page included questions about one’s motivation and the use of 
working time; the third page had a free word question giving the respondent the chance to 
express their opinion about incentive systems and the project; and finally the last page 
consisted of 9 demographic questions. The survey had 19 questions in total, and the aim was 
to keep it in a reasonable length so that the length would not be a reason to stop answering the 
questionnaire. It was also found important to define some of the central concepts on the first 
page so that the questions would be understood correctly and that the answers would give 
right and useful information about the professors’ opinions. Furthermore, it was found 
especially important that the differences amongst all the schools, for instance the inclusion of 
the artistic productions for ARTS or the different histories with rewarding, were taken into 
account.  
The process of creating the survey started on the 12
th
 of March in 2014 when the project team 
decided that it was to be the main data collection method (see Figure 5 for the data collection 
timeline). The survey was processed for approximately four weeks, and during that time it 
was sent to the rest of the steering group for comments three times: on March 19, March 27, 
and April 3. In addition, it was sent to an ARTS professor outside the steering group on April  
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Table 4: Responses for the survey  
The number of responses and response rates for the survey in April 2014. 
School N All 
response 
rate 
ALL 124 407 30.5 % 
ARTS 7 62 11.3 % 
BIZ 25 84 29.8 % 
CHEM 19 45 42.2 % 
ELEC 15 52 28.8 % 
ENG 17 60 28.3 % 
SCI 41 104 39.4 % 
 
7 for ARTS-specific comments. Based on the comments, the survey was significantly 
modified; several questions were added and some were made clearer and more unambiguous. 
It was eventually sent out to the Aalto professors’ mailing list by the head of the steering 
group on April 9 and was open for answers until April 22. A reminder was sent on April 17, 
five days before the survey was closed. Before the reminder, 87 people had answered the 
survey and after it we received 37 more responses. 
The professors’ mailing list included 407 professors on the day the mail was sent. As can be 
seen in Table 4, 124 professors in total answered within the given time frame, which leads to 
a quite high overall response rate, 30.5 %. There was, anyhow, variation between different 
schools, ARTS professors being the least and CHEM professors the most eager to answer. 
The low response rate among ARTS leads to more unreliable and less generalizable 
information about ARTS preferences. Because of this, two additional interviews were done to 
support the ARTS perceptions. With the other schools, the number of observations is enough 
to draw conclusions about the school’s perceptions. 
4.3.2 Interviews 
Besides the survey, ten interviews from half an hour to an hour were conducted between May 
28 and June 16. Eight of the interviewees represented the management, including e.g. the 
President and the Provost of Aalto and the Deans of each of the schools. The interviews were 
conducted in order to understand the management’s objectives for the reward system. It is 
valuable to understand the point of view of the university management so that the motives and 
the goals of rewarding are taken into consideration when planning the new model.  
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In addition, two additive interviews with ARTS professors were conducted on June 3 and 13 
in order to get a more comprehensive picture of ARTS professors’ opinions. The steering 
group decided to conduct the ARTS professors’ interviews as complementary to the survey 
because of the low response rate amongst the school. This way also the ARTS point of view is 
better considered. Furthermore, the other one of the interviewees was from the Department of 
Architecture which was moved from the technical school to ARTS. This leads to an 
interesting situation where he used to have an incentive system but after the transfer no more. 
The structure of the interviews and the details about them are shown in Appendix 2 and 
Appendix 3 and the schedule of the interviews in Appendix 4. 
All of the interviews were recorded and transcribed. The management interviews were 
conducted so that the head of the steering group was the main interviewer and I was a co-
interviewer taking notes during three of the interviews. Furthermore, I transcribed two and an 
outside person six the interviews and all of the transcriptions and the recorded interviews 
were used as data for this thesis. The interviews of the ARTS professors were conducted 
mainly by me, the head of the steering group being present in one of the interviews and the 
transcriptions were done by the same outside person as the management interviews. 
The objective of the ARTS professors’ interview was to gain information similar to that of 
gained from the survey: to understand the opinions and the positions ARTS professors have 
towards rewarding and incentives as well as what they expect from a reward system. 
Furthermore, the representatives of the management were interviewed in order to find out 
what they think about rewarding, consider the organizational objectives for rewarding, and 
evaluate the possible conflict of interests between the management and the professors and 
whether there are interests to be aligned.  
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5 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
In the empirical part of the study, I will first describe the issues that have an influence on 
rewarding in Aalto University: the university’s strategy and other institutions. Furthermore, I 
will assess the individual schools’ former reward systems and the current reward system in 
Aalto. In addition, I will look over the professors’ opinions about the different reward systems 
and expectations regarding motivation and performance-based rewarding in general based on 
the responses to the survey, the supplementary ARTS interviews, and the other data. The 
primary focus of the study is on the professors and their motivation but in order to understand 
the objectives of rewarding, I will briefly go through the management’s opinions in 
subchapter 5.4.2. This section provides an overview of the findings, followed by the results in 
the form of a suggestion for a new reward system and an analysis in the next chapter. 
5.1 Background of performance measurement in Aalto University 
As many scholars have pointed out, if performance-based rewarding is used, linking it to the 
organizational strategy is essential in order to communicate what kind of performance is 
desirable. That is why the starting point for designing a new reward system should be the 
examination of the organization’s strategy. Aalto University’s strategy is largely based on the 
Universities Act (558/2009) and the statements of the Ministry of Education and Culture. It is 
also determined in the four-year contract between the Ministry and the university which is 
similarly based on the Universities Act. Furthermore, Aalto has an internal funding model that 
follows the strategy. Aalto has four core strategy areas which follow directly the key 
objectives stated in the law. Each core strategy is further focused for Aalto and has defined 
key performance indicators (KPIs) (Table 5). 
Table 5: Aalto University's strategy 
The strategic areas and KPI’s of Aalto University (Aalto University, 2014e). 
Research excellence Pioneer in education Trend-setting art Societal impact 
Original, impactful, and 
interdisciplinary 
Students in focus, a new 
learning culture and 
approaches 
Art, architecture and design 
as key drivers for improving 
living environments 
Adding value through 
entrepreneurship, business 
liaison and societal 
interactions 
 
 Publication quality 
 ERC grants 
 Competitive funding 
 Awards & recognition 
 Quality and quantity of  
interdisciplinary 
projects 
 Tenured professors 
 
 Teaching quality 
 Student performance 
 Alumni & employer 
satisfaction 
 Multidisciplinary 
graduates 
 
 International visibility 
 Quantity and Quality 
of artistic  
productions 
 Grants & awards 
 
 International 
visibility 
 Partners’ perception 
of Aalto 
 Number of spin-offs 
 Number of partners 
 Funding from 
partners 
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The contract between Minedu and Aalto determines the university-specific goals for the 
years 2013-2016 in more detail. The Aalto-specific part of the contract is divided into three 
parts concerning the mission, profile, and focus areas; the central development areas; and the 
funding of the university. According to the contract, Aalto University profiles itself as a novel 
development environment for education, research, and innovation. It should aim at being an 
international research university combining science, technology, art, and business in an 
innovative way. (Contract Aalto University, 2012.) The basic funding is determined based on 
the regulations and the focus areas defined in the contract. The strategy indicators listed in the 
contract are as follows (ibid.): 
1) Publications (crown indicator) 
2) Top researchers and units 
3) Progress of the students’ studies 
4) International artistic productions and publications 
5) Share of foreign professors and post docs 
6) Total amount of funding from other than academic partners 
These, as many of the strategy KPIs, are university-wide and difficult to control by an 
individual professor. However, they are connected to the basic funding level and form an 
important incentive for the university management. Consequently, they should be reflected in 
the expectations towards individual or group performance and thus it would be sensible that 
these indicators, as well as the KPIs, affect the communicated expectations at least indirectly. 
All in all, internationalization, innovation, and research are highly emphasized in the contract. 
In addition to the contract with Minedu, Aalto University also has its own, internal funding 
model which, in turn, is linked to that of the Ministry of Education and Culture. In addition to 
providing incentives towards the strategic goals of the university, the model also aims at 
encouraging cost efficiency (Aalto University Funding Model, 2012). Cost efficiency is one 
of the trends in New Public Management, and the funding model is one example of a practice 
where the use of NPM is clearly visible. It emphasizes the autonomy of each school (ibid.), 
which is reflected in the current reward system as well. In line with the idea of autonomy as 
well as NPM, the new model is a full-cost model, meaning that the costs of joint services will 
be charged from each school based on the allocation of resources (ibid.). Consequently, it 
transfers the budgeting responsibility to the school levels even more comprehensively. This 
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follows the idea of NPM even more, being a very clear practice adopted from the private 
sector. 
5.2 Professors’ motivation 
From the motivation point of view, the professors in Aalto University seem to be extremely 
motivated to perform in the strategic core areas of their work: research, teaching, and 
interaction with society as well as artistic activities in ARTS
8
. Chart 1 shows the motivation 
averages by schools in the scale of 1-5 and overall, the motivation averages were 4.78 for 
research, 4.00 for artistic activities (in ARTS since it is not relevant for the others), 4.03 for 
teaching, and 3.60 for interaction with society. 
When asked about their motivation drivers, the professors identified things that derive from 
intrinsic motivation especially what comes to research, such as curiosity (BIZ, ELEC, ENG, 
and SCI professors), constant drive to do research (SCI professor), and science itself (CHEM 
and SCI professors). There were some professors that were extrinsically driven by the Tenure 
Track (CHEM professor) and gaining status in the community (BIZ professor), for instance, 
but they were in the minority among the respondents. Also teaching was more driven by 
intrinsic factors rather than external rewards. In that sense, the starting point for the 
professors’ motivation is seems excellent and intrinsic motivation plays an important role in 
the overall motivation, which would indicate that it could be difficult to have a major positive 
 
Chart 1: Professors’ motivation 
Motivation averages for different areas of work by schools, scale 1-5. 
 
                                                 
8
 In other schools than ARTS, artistic activities are not a relevant part of the professors’ work 
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ARTS BIZ CHEM ELEC ENG SCI
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impact on the overall motivation by external rewards. However, they can have a significant 
crowding-out effect if planned inadequately.  
What comes to the professors’ motivation to interact with society, it is not as high as that of to 
do research or teach. However, the average is above three in every school so there would not 
seem to be major motivation problems in that respect either. Interestingly, older professors are 
more motivated to interact with society than younger professors, and the difference is 
statistically significant according to the Chi Square test (2-sided Asymp. Sig. 0.094). This 
could be because of the gained knowledge and status during the career that give credibility for 
the interaction. In addition, Full Professors’ motivation average for interaction was 3.73 
which was higher than the overall average. Overall, a motivation average well above neutral 
(3) for a component of work that is not defined as primary in the Universities Act seems quite 
robust. The motivation drivers for interaction with society were not as strongly intrinsic as for 
research and teaching but derived from an external goal more often than purely from intrinsic 
motivation. This might indicate that there could be more room for properly designed external 
rewards what comes to interaction. 
The survey indicated clearly that the professors are not motivated to do administrative tasks 
while the average motivation throughout the university was 2.48, well below neutral. The 
motivation drivers were far from intrinsic, which implies that the motivation could be 
increased by external rewards. However, it has to be considered whether there is a need to 
reward for administration at all since it is not part of the core strategy of the university and 
does not belong to the essence of professors’ work. Even though administration has to be 
done, it might be even a positive thing that there is low motivation to do it: that way the 
professors focus more on the strategically important tasks, research and teaching as well as 
interaction with society, than administration. Therefore, it does not seem necessary to 
introduce new forms of rewarding for administration while it does not advance the strategic 
goals of the university as efficiently as the core functions. 
All in all, the survey indicates that the professors in Aalto are motivated to conduct the tasks 
that are in the essence of the university’s strategy in the first place and moreover, the 
motivation seems to be strongly intrinsically driven. On that account, there does not seem to 
be much room for increasing the overall motivation with extrinsic rewards. The rewards 
should concentrate not on consuming and crowding out intrinsic motivation but rather 
supporting it. 
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5.3 Former and current reward systems 
The practices of rewarding professors for their performance have varied significantly among 
the three universities that form Aalto University. The traditions of performance-based 
rewarding were the strongest in Helsinki School of Technology (TKK) with its rather 
straightforward incentive system while in University of Art and Design Helsinki 
(Taideteollinen korkeakoulu, TaiK) performance-based rewards did not play a central role at 
all. In Helsinki School of Economics an official incentive system did not exist but professors 
did get rewarded for their performance to some extent by the HSE Foundation. At the time of 
this study, professors were rewarded for their performance in the form of a mechanical 
incentive system in the entire Aalto University except for ARTS due to the strong resistance it 
faced there. In this thesis, the system used in Aalto at the time of the study will be called the 
‘current system’ in order to distinguish it from the other systems. The reward systems in the 
former universities and in Aalto are introduced shortly in the following in order to provide a 
better understanding of the backgrounds of the current situation and the need for developing 
the rewarding at Aalto. In addition, I will recap the opinions about the different systems that 
arose from the survey and the interviews. 
5.3.1 Former reward systems 
TKK system 
The former Helsinki School of Technology has the longest history of the three former schools 
with performance-based incentive systems. It is the predecessor of the system that is currently 
in use in Aalto and was in use in TKK from the 1990s until the merger. The basic idea is that 
the bonus could amount to 2-20 % of the professor’s annual salary and was to be applied and 
granted by the President of the university. There were practically four criteria: the first, the 
volume of external funding raised during the past three years, was the triggering factor and 
without fulfilling the required level, the bonus was not possible to obtain. After meeting the 
external funding criterion, two out of the following three criteria were to be fulfilled: the 
required amount of master’s degrees, doctoral degrees, and scientific publications. 
Additionally, it was characteristic for the model that the professor who received a bonus was 
able to divide it between those people who contributed to their results and that the bonuses 
were eventually paid from departments’ budgets and therefore depended on whether the 
department’s financial result was positive or not. (Aalto University, 2014d.) 
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Table 6: Satisfaction, old TKK system 
The satisfaction rates with the TKK system, averages by technical schools, scale 1-5. 
  Mean N 
CHEM 4.00 5 
ELEC 4.00 7 
ENG 4.00 4 
SCI 3.23 22 
Total 3.55 38 
Based on the survey responses, the TKK model was rather liked. The satisfaction average 
amongst the former TKK professors was 3.55, and Table 6 shows that in all the other 
technical schools except SCI the average was 4.00 which is quite high. One of the strongest 
reasons why the incentive system was so liked was that it was perceived simple, clear, and 
transparent. For instance, professors pointed out in the survey that the “old TKK system was 
much more transparent [than the current system]” (CHEM and ELEC professors) and that the 
“TKK system was simple: a few quality criteria + you pay the bonus from the money you 
bring in yourself” (ELEC professor).  
There was also criticism towards the old TKK system. The fact that the bonuses were paid 
from the departments’ funds was seen inequitable and increasing harmful competition, as one 
ELEC professor pointed out: “If the bonus is paid from the department’s basic funding, it only 
makes professors compete with each other instead of cooperating”. Compared to the previous 
comment, there were differences with how professors perceived the source of the bonus: even 
though it was paid from the department’s money, the central role that the external funding 
played in the criteria had the effect that some might have seen it as earmarked to them and 
therefore the bonus more earned. The strong emphasis on external funding was also 
considered a negative issue, although many saw it positively. For instance, a SCI professor 
compared the bonus system to a ‘bingo’ system for allowing the bonus only if all the 
requirements were met, i.e. one had to perform well in all the areas. It was also stated that the 
old system was ”clear in terms of its rules and one could be happy for the reward received 
even though it did not motivate towards the future” (SCI professor). All in all, the TKK 
system does not seem to have raised strong negative emotions even though some defects were 
identified. On the contrary, the top performing professors who received the bonus regularly 
perceived it as part of their fixed salary and counted it in their annual income automatically. 
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HSE system 
In Helsinki School of Economics, there was no official incentive or bonus system before the 
implementation of the current Aalto system. However, professors received a significant 
project management fee if they acquired a certain amount of external funding. This is 
comparable to the old TKK system but it does not acknowledge any output criteria in addition 
to the amount of acquired funding; hence, it cannot be considered as a pure performance-
based bonus system. In addition, the HSE Foundation granted, and still grants, awards and 
recognition grants for research and teaching, among others, in HSE and nowadays Aalto 
University School of Business twice a year (HSE Foundation, 2014). Examples of these are 
the Teacher of the Year, the Researcher of the Year, and the Doctor of the Year. As can be 
seen, recognition has been given to other staff as well, not only professors. 
It seems that professors were also quite satisfied with the old HSE system, with a satisfaction 
average of 3.44 (N=9). However, the small number of responses in this particular question 
decreases the reliability of any conclusions that could be drawn from the survey. The HSE 
system got positive feedback for rewarding for good quality publications, which was said to 
have been “aligned with school’s strategy” (BIZ professor). Furthermore, another BIZ 
professor pointed out in one of the email conversations that in the old [project management 
fee] system it was possible to get a bonus that was significantly bigger than in the current 
system by, for instance, bringing in a large amount of external funding instead of having to be 
consistently good in all the areas. 
TaiK system 
In University of Art and Design Helsinki, there has not been a history with performance-
based bonus systems. It is also difficult to draw any conclusions about the satisfaction with 
rewarding in TaiK based on the four responses in the survey. The four responses were divided 
equally between the options 1-4 giving an average of 2.5, so there was not much consistency 
among the responses. One reason for the scattered opinions might be the fact that a clear 
reward system did not exist in TaiK and therefore it might have been difficult to evaluate the 
satisfaction levels.  
5.3.2 Current reward system at Aalto University 
Since Aalto University is a relatively new university, the reward system has been introduced 
recently as well. In the current reward system, professors’ performance is taken into account 
in an incentive system that covers five schools out of the existing six, including BIZ, CHEM, 
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ELEC, ENG, and SCI; ARTS being outside the incentive program. The current system has 
been in use since 2012 and was approved until 2014, which is one reason why the project of 
building a new system was initiated. One reason given for the current system is that for 
legislative reasons, the existing benefits could not be discontinued at once, referring to the 
bonus system that existed in TKK. However, it was also launched at BIZ which did not have 
an incentive system before while ARTS negotiated not to take the incentive program into use. 
(Top manager A at Aalto level.) 
The model is based on the one used in the former TKK, the only school that had an actual 
bonus system before the merger. It has similar elements and structure than the old system, 
having the same components but a considerably larger number of criteria. The system reflects 
the central KPI areas of the funding model: educational and research excellence and societal 
impact. In addition, the model is designed to be in line with the long-term strategy of the 
university. In addition to the individual level, the total amount of the incentive is also 
dependent on the university, the school, and the department level performances.  
As can be seen in Table 7 showing the simplified structure of the current incentive system, the 
final amount of the incentive has several variable levels with different weights. In addition, 
some of the individual level indicators have several measures, and the different schools can 
modify the measures and their importance in accordance with their preferences. The number 
of the different indicator levels and measures leads to a situation where determining the final 
amount of compensation requires multiple calculations, the process ends up being 
complicated, and the transparency of the final result suffers due to all the variables. In 
addition, the transparency suffered because no feedback about the measures was provided for 
the professors after the fact. 
Table 7: Current incentive system in Aalto University 
The current Aalto incentive system: the performance levels, weights, and indicators (Stelwagen, 2013). 
Level Weight Indicator 
AALTO 10 % 
University level outcome 
- Good general progress 
SCHOOL 20 % 
School level outcome 
- Good general progress towards targets 
DEPARTMENT 30 % Department level outcome 
INDIVIDUAL 40 % 
- Publications 
- Competitive funding 
- Supervising thesis work (B. Sc., M.Sc., Ph.D.) 
- Teaching 
- Academic/societal activity 
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As can be seen in Chart 2, professors are not satisfied with the current system at all. All of the 
schools have an average below three and the satisfaction in ARTS, ELEC, and SCI was even 
two or below, which indicates severe dissatisfaction with the system (total average 2.12). 
Chart 3, in turn, indicates that even though those professors who have received a bonus within 
the current incentive system are more satisfied with the system (average 2.72) than those who 
have not (2.00), their satisfaction is still quite low, below three. There are barely any satisfied 
professors who have not received any bonus but also only four out of 18 professors who 
received a bonus are satisfied or very satisfied with the system. Only by looking at the 
satisfaction numbers, it can be clearly seen why there is also a practical need to create a new 
reward system throughout the university. 
The professors seem to be rather unanimous with why the current system is not very 
successful based on the comments in the survey as well as the email conversations from 
before. The dissatisfaction arises partly from the complexity and opaqueness of the system, a 
result of the complex calculation model. For instance, ten professors mentioned in their open 
answers that the current system is too complicated or that the metrics are not very successful. 
It was also stated several times that at least when used for the first time, the criteria was not 
known in advance, which lead to a situation where “one could not impact on own 
performance since the measurement factors were not known” (SCI professor) and “it did not 
have any chance of affecting my activities” (SCI professor). 
 
 
Chart 2: Satisfaction, current Aalto system 
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Chart 3: Satisfaction frequencies, current Aalto system 
The satisfaction rates with the current Aalto system, 
averages by schools, scale 1-5. 
 
The satisfaction frequencies in % of those received 
and not received a bonus, scale 1-5. 
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Related to the issue that the criteria were not known beforehand, communicating the incentive 
system received quite a lot of critique as well. It was said that “if a bonus system has been in 
existence it is a disgrace that it would be kept secret” (ARTS professor). While it is not 
surprising that it has not been communicated since there has not been a bonus system in 
ARTS, the statement however indicates that nothing had been communicated at all. A BIZ 
professor stated that “I do not have any information on any bonus systems though I've heard 
there are some”, implying that information was not provided through official channels in 
schools where the system was in use either, at least not very effectively anyhow. This and the 
complexity of the system lead to a situation where both the steering and motivating effects 
were lost while the professors became confused about what was expected from them and can 
hardly be expected to act according to the criteria.  
Besides the communicational issues, the choice of the measures and their emphasis generated 
a lot of criticism. Even though some professors said that the current system is good with its 
wide scope and exact measures, the majority was of the opinion that the system should not 
require excelling on all performance aspects. For instance, a CHEM professor pointed out that 
“it is impossible to fulfill all categories required for getting a bonus or reward, so remember 
that one size does not fit all”. There was frustration among professors that they should have 
focused on everything instead of being recognized for being a top performer in one field, 
whether it was research, teaching, or having an influence on Aalto community. 
In addition to fulfilling all the criteria at high levels, the difficulty of measuring all the 
dimensions of professors’ work is visible in the following comments: 
I think that overall, there's too much focus on metrics and analytics at 
Aalto. -- The problem with metrics and gamification is that one tends to get 
what one measures and scores, and oftentimes excessively so. Designing a 
perfect scoring system is a difficult research problem of its own. (SCI 
professor) 
The current bonus system is a mechanical calculation of tasks performed 
and as such it is more suitable for lined of work where the quantity rather 
than quality of performance matters. (BIZ professor) 
All bonus systems tie bonuses to some measurable outcomes assumed to be 
solely due to the individual's actions. One implication of this is that actions 
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which are not measurable or are measured with large imprecision and will 
not be taken. (BIZ professor) 
Furthermore, another criticism towards the metrics concerned the standardization elements. It 
was perceived unjust that elements that individual professors cannot influence were included 
in the model, these being the Aalto, school, and department level performance. This, in some 
cases, resulted in some top performing professors not receiving a bonus or receiving only a 
very modest amount because the department was performing lower than expected. As this was 
perceived inequitable, it had a negative effect on the professor’s motivation and satisfaction. 
An explanation for some of the dissatisfaction with the current Aalto system among 
professors in the technical schools is the fact that in most cases, the change from the bonus 
received from the TKK system to the amount received in the new system was too drastic, and 
specifically to the negative direction. A SCI professor points out the following: 
I am deeply disappointed with the recent drastic changes in the bonus 
system. After receiving the full bonus every year in the old TKK bonus 
system, I did not get any bonus at all in the new Aalto system last year. The 
value of the bonus that I have previously received was annually 20 % of my 
salary! 
This has not so much to do with the content of the current system in itself but the outcome 
relative to the previous system. However, this is one of the cases where a professor was 
including the annual bonus in the overall yearly salary in their mind and as a consequence of 
the new incentive system, the annual total compensation dropped significantly even though 
the professor’s performance most likely did not decrease. Almost half of the professors that 
had received a bonus in TKK did not receive a bonus in the current system (13 out of 27 from 
those who responded both sections) and for most professors that received a bonus in both 
systems the amount of the bonus more than halved. There was only one professor that 
maintained the level of the bonus and one that received a bonus in the Aalto system but not 
the TKK system; in the latter case, not gaining the TKK bonus was most likely explained by 
the short career as a professor. Some professors also expressed that the bonus received from 
the system was rather insignificant. As an ARTS professor put it: “Pay enough or don't pay at 
all”. Therefore, if the amount of the incentive is very minor compared to the trouble of 
determining the amount with a complex and bureaucratic model, there is a danger that the cost 
of the system eventually amounts to more than its benefits are. 
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Besides its structure, one of the dominating features of the current incentive system at Aalto is 
the fact that the payout determined by the model is, in practice, a redistribution of each 
department’s money. In other words, the reward does not increase the amount of resources 
within a department but instead decreases the overall resources available for the common use 
within the department, which is similar to the old TKK system. There might be some 
consequences to this regarding the overall department motivation since those professors and 
other faculty members who do not get a bonus might feel the redistribution of funds 
inequitable.  
 [E]xtremely damaging in Aalto 2012/2013 sy[s]tem was that the bonus for 
professors would have been taken from the lab's/department's basic funding 
... that means from other persons' pockets and thereby decreasing rather 
than increasing the possibilities to carry out successful research (SCI 
professor) 
What comes to ARTS professors, it is difficult to find a clear trend based on both the survey 
and the interviews whether they are satisfied with the current rewarding in Aalto or not. When 
asking about the satisfaction with the current Aalto system among ARTS professors in the 
survey, the average was 2.00 among the respondents (N=5). Even though the average is low, 
the small sample does not allow drawing any conclusions. In addition, the answers can be 
biased due to the low response rate in ARTS while it might be possible that only those who 
are very distracted by the current situation answered the survey whereas those who are not 
unhappy or bothered by it did not. One way or another, the survey does not tell much about 
the current opinions. Also the interviewees did not clearly state whether they were satisfied or 
dissatisfied with the current situation, however they did see potential for improving the 
overall rewarding.  
However, the Department of Architecture is an exceptional unit within the entire Aalto 
University since it has been part of TKK before the merger but was transferred to ARTS in 
2012. Hence, the professors who have been in the department before 2012 have, on one hand, 
had a bonus system before the merger but then after being transferred as part of ARTS they 
have not had any incentive system at all. The other one of the interviewed ARTS professors 
was from the Department of Architecture and has thus experienced both cases: having and not 
having a bonus system. He pointed out some shortcomings of the TKK system – such as the 
built-in requirement of excelling in all the measured areas of work and the fact that those 
tasks that were not measured were also not rewarded – but recognized the need of being 
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acknowledged for one’s achievements. At the moment of the interview, he did not seem 
dissatisfied even though there was no incentive system in ARTS. Anyhow, he mentioned that 
the dean gave recognitions for various reasons such as research or other special 
accomplishments and considered them good.  
To sum up the opinions about the current incentive system, there were not many positive 
comments from the professors. The biggest criticism concentrated on the lack of transparency, 
the complexity of the system, the fact that the model does not recognize top performers in one 
field only, and the Aalto, school, and department level elements that are not under the control 
of an individual professor. Instead of motivating or steering them, the current incentive 
system seemed to frustrate the professors and confuse them with the number of measures. 
Even though some benefits could be achieved with an incentive system, it looks like the 
current system did not reach the positive effects. It seems that when the model was created, 
the managerial practices were pronounced too literally and it was not integrated into the 
university and professional contexts. Therefore more consideration on how to take the 
academic context into account is in place when designing the new reward system. 
5.4 Expectations towards rewarding 
5.4.1 Professors’ point of view 
As the previous chapter shows, the current incentive system at Aalto did not reach the benefits 
that are intended with it. Hence, there seems to be a clear need to develop a new system of 
rewarding. The first step of defining a new reward system is to decide whether to include a 
performance-based element in it or not. Based on the survey and the interviews, it is quite 
clear that most of the professors do want to be rewarded based on their performance. 
However, it is even clearer that a system resembling the current incentive system would not 
be preferable or very motivating, and it is not wanted by the professors or the management. 
Even though over 70 % of all the professors stated in the survey that a bonus system of some 
kind is needed (see Chart 4), in the following question about compensation elements the 
average importance of short-term bonuses was as low as 1.88 and even 40 % of the 
respondents answered that they should not be included in the overall reward system (Chart 5). 
ELEC was the only school where less than half of the professors said that a bonus system is 
needed, and surprisingly in ARTS, six out of seven of the respondents were in favor of a 
bonus system. 
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Chart 4: Need for a bonus system 
Whether the professors perceive a bonus system needed or not by schools. 
 
Chart 5: Compensation elements 
How important professors find different compensation elements and whether they think they should be included in the overall 
reward system or not, importance in scale 1-5. 
 
These two findings seem to be in conflict with each other but when looking at the overall 
picture, the contradiction can be explained. For instance, a bonus system can be understood in 
different ways. If we look at Chart 5 and the open answers for question 3 in the survey (see 
Appendix 1 for the survey questions), it looks like the professors have interpreted the concept 
widely. Giving a reward for the whole research group stands out in the answers, for example, 
and long-term bonus is not nearly as disliked as short-term bonus. Also connecting career 
issues with rewarding – for instance more career steps after Full Professor level or a merit 
increase system – gains support, merit increase reaching an average of 3.33 in importance, 
including the ‘should not be included’ answers with a value of 0. Based on the data, it appears 
that the professors consider a bonus as a system of rewarding for performance in this context 
and they are in favor of that linkage existing. However, a bonus in its traditional meaning (an 
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annual reward based on metrics measuring short-term performance) faces resistance among 
professors. 
What comes to the characteristics that professors find important for a reward system based on 
the survey, over 10 % of the survey respondents commented in the open answers that the new 
system should be either simple, clear, transparent, or fair, or several of them. In addition, 
several respondents emphasized that the system should not require being good at all the 
performance areas but recognize success in only one or few of the areas as well – this 
referring to performance-based pay. It was also clear that the professors do not value “some 
artificial Aalto/school/department level performance in the system” (ELEC professor). The 
comment continued that “when I work hard, I don't want to be put down by others who didn't 
do their job as well. I want to be the sole responsible for any reward I might get”, which is 
consistent with the criticism the current Aalto system received that performance-based reward 
systems have a positive effect on performance when the targets are under the control of the 
employee.  
If performance is to be rewarded, the professors at Aalto distinguishably prefer a merit 
increase system over a bonus system. The average is above 3 and only 11 % marked that it 
should not be included in the overall reward system. Furthermore, many of the professors 
hoped that the salaries reflected performance consistently with merit increase or that the 
salaries were individually negotiated. For instance, it was said that “instead of bonuses, a 
system where all wages are individually negotiated between the Dean and the Professor (with 
the approval of the HoD [Head of Department]) is needed” (BIZ professor) and that “the 
professors' salaries should be defined based on performance, and the performance criteria 
should be clear” (SCI professor). However, since some of the professors regard the yearly 
bonus as an important compensation for their extra work, they stated that if the incentive 
system was to be abandoned, the extra work they do should be compensated by a salary raise. 
Additionally, when performance is reflected in the salary, it is easier to consider it holistically 
and thus recognize specialization, which the professors considered important as well. 
Other compensation elements that got an average 3 or above from the professors were 
additional resources (3.42; 11.9 % ‘should not be included’ answers) and recognition (3.00; 
16.2 %). Other elements got lower averages than 3 and over a fifth of the respondents were of 
the opinion that they should not be included in overall rewarding at all (see Chart 5 for further 
data); therefore, it is reasonable to abandon these elements from the analysis. As to additional 
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resources, they were seen as a good way of rewarding a whole research group for their 
achievements rather than directing an individual bonus for a professor. For instance, a SCI 
professor noted the following: 
If money need[s] to be given out as bonuses, then this could be in the form 
of resources to research group - that way Aalto would put resources to 
places that give the best performance (in indicators Aalto thinks as 
relevant). 
This was explicitly stated in nine of the comments, and the reasons for this emerge from 
inequity aversion
9
 and the appreciation of academic freedom while with additional resources, 
successful teams will gain more flexibility and autonomy over their research and work. This 
would also not feel like an inequitable distribution of a department’s money since it would 
concern a larger group of people who have contributed to the results and the reward would 
further benefit the university while it would be used to advance research. Furthermore, time 
for research can be understood as a resource as well, which supports the idea of increasing 
academic freedom. As an ARTS professor said, many seem to be of the opinion that “the key 
is to provide resources for liberating time for research & resources for research group”.  
Recognition, on the other hand, divided opinions between the schools
10
. In ENG and SCI the 
averages were above 3 (3.75 and 3.19 respectively) whereas in the other schools, the averages 
remained under 3. However, many professors did express that in their opinion, other 
recognition is more important than bonuses. Some, in turn, stated that bonuses are also a good 
way to show recognition for good performance. One way or another, the majority seems to  
find it important that when they succeed and achieve high performance, it is important that the 
success is acknowledged by their community. The acknowledgements from both the school 
level as well as from the Aalto level were seen valuable.  
Performance criteria 
In addition to how they should be rewarded, it was also asked from the professors what they 
see as relevant criteria to base the rewarding on. Surprisingly or not, the criteria look 
somewhat similar to those of the current system. Publication quality was the foremost 
preferred criteria, reaching almost the average of 4 in importance. Other criteria with an 
average above 3 were publication activity, competitive funding, thesis supervision, teaching 
                                                 
9
 In this case, the feeling of equitability arises from the idea that instead of one person only getting a bonus for 
the whole group’s success, everybody who contributed to it will benefit as well 
10
 The differences were not, however, statistically significant 
 61  
 
quality, and research group performance (see Table 8 for importance averages). All the other 
criteria that got high averages were already included in both the old TKK system and the 
current Aalto system except teaching quality and research group performance. The latter has 
not been included in the former nor the current system even though the professors strongly 
advocated for including it. However, deducing from the comments and the dislike of 
including any other organizational level performance in the criteria, Aalto professors do not 
want individuals to be rewarded for the research group performance. It looks like they rather 
want the whole research group to be rewarded for the team’s performance in those schools 
where research is mostly done in research groups. 
Table 8: Merit increase criteria 
 Criteria ARTS 
N=6 
BIZ 
N=21-
22 
CHEM 
N=18-19 
ELEC 
N=14 
ENG 
N=15-17 
SCI 
N=29-
36 
Total 
N=95-
114 
Research 
and artistic 
activities 
  
Publication quality 4.50 4.05 4.21 3.64 3.25 4.03 3.93 
Publication activity 3.17 3.50 4.21 3.00 2.94 3.34 3.41 
Competitive funding 3.33 3.14 3.74 3.07 3.07 3.37 3.31 
International visibility 3.33 3.18 3.00 2.71 2.71 2.86 2.93 
External awards & 
recognition 
3.00 2.77 3.16 2.86 1.88 2.86 2.75 
Funding from partners 2.00 2.27 3.05 2.21 2.13 2.74 2.51 
Interdisciplinary 
projects 
4.00 1.86 2.32 1.71 2.35 1.86 2.11 
Artistic productions 3.33 2.00 2.08 1.58 2.07 2.07 2.07 
Education 
  
Thesis supervision 4.00 3.00 3.90 2.86 3.12 3.43 3.34 
Teaching quality 4.00 2.91 3.21 2.93 3.00 3.83 3.32 
Student feedback 3.00 2.59 2.74 2.36 2.53 3.08 2.75 
Student performance 3.67 2.32 2.53 2.21 2.47 2.46 2.48 
Interdisciplinary 
teaching 
4.33 1.57 1.79 1.00 2.06 1.74 1.81 
Societal 
impact 
  
Contribution to the 
community/industry 
3.00 2.82 2.84 1.86 2.35 2.89 2.66 
National societal 
participation 
3.50 2.59 2.11 1.93 2.24 2.47 2.39 
Partner cooperation 3.00 1.83 2.00 1.36 1.75 2.63 2.08 
Spin-offs 2.00 1.50 1.58 1.50 1.35 2.80 1.92 
Media visibility 2.50 2.10 1.32 1.64 1.35 1.80 1.72 
Other Research group 
performance 
4.17 2.46 3.68 2.79 3.25 3.71 3.30 
Administrative tasks 3.00 2.09 2.47 2.14 2.00 2.15 2.22 
Department 
performance 
3.33 1.77 2.00 2.00 2.44 1.97 2.08 
School performance 2.50 1.46 1.58 1.29 2.00 1.50 1.60 
Aalto performance 2.17 1.41 1.32 1.14 1.44 1.20 1.34 
 
How important professors find different merit increase criteria, scale 1-5. 
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The criteria for research seem to be quite straightforward and agreed by the professors. They 
are also relatively simple to measure and have been included in the bonus systems for a long 
time, which means that additional systems for gathering the data would not be needed to 
establish. In ARTS, also interdisciplinary projects and artistic productions were favored 
unlike in the other schools, which is explained by the artistic and principally interdisciplinary 
nature of the school and its projects. The emphasis between the different areas of work divide 
opinions: on one hand, many professors say that the focus should be on research while “top 
quality research will also drive teaching” and create a “genuine novelty-based opportunity for 
societal impact, funding, collaboration etc.” (ELEC professor). On the other hand, some 
professors say that the emphasis has been too much on research and other fields of work 
should be recognized as well, such as teaching and service. As education is also one of the 
purposes of universities and a strategic area of Aalto, it would be logical that teaching would 
be given a more significant role in rewarding as well. 
Another element that many professors wanted to include in the criteria was acquiring external 
funding. Even though it is more of an input rather than a performance output, it was motivated 
with the following statements, for instance: 
It is fair to pay bonus to those who do good job based on strategic aims 
such as in getting funding -- (SCI professor) 
The old system was also fair in that sense that those who raised a lot of 
funding to TKK got some small share of it if they performed well. (SCI 
professor) 
Furthermore, it was considered fair that the professors who allocated a lot of their time in 
acquiring external funding get compensated for this effort because it can be extremely time-
consuming and was seen to advance freedom of research in the form of increased resources. 
On the other hand, some professors stated that especially in the TKK system, there was too 
much emphasis on external funding instead of actual outputs. 
When looking at the other end of the list, it is striking that besides including any 
organizational level performance, most professors do not want to include any criteria that 
rewards for administrative tasks. For instance, a SCI professor indicated that “there should be 
no bonus rewards for routine work such as administration, committee work --”. These routine 
tasks are widely seen as part of the job description and therefore rewarding for doing them is 
considered odd. On the other hand, the motivation to do administration is overall quite low 
(2.48 on average, see Chart 1 on page 47 for school-specific data) so in that sense it would be 
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justified to include them in the criteria. This way external motivators would be established to 
add to the overall motivation. However, many professors feel frustrated with the amount of 
bureaucracy that steal time from research and teaching and would want it to be reduced to the 
minimum. This applies especially to routine administrative tasks and bureaucracy that does 
not advance the community or the strategic goals. Furthermore, the professors see the cutting 
of wasteful bureaucracy as increased freedom of work, which in turn would increase their 
overall work motivation. 
Nevertheless, there are tasks that are essential for the development of the university, such as 
having a managerial position or sitting in committees. Most of these tasks are already 
compensated by paying separately for those who have these positions and do these tasks. 
Even though they are extremely important for the university and might be strategically 
crucial, there is little reasoning for double rewarding for them. On the other hand, if a 
professor makes an exceptional and significant effort for the university in terms of 
administrative positions, it could be justified to acknowledge that through other recognition. It 
certainly should not be a reducing factor when evaluating overall performance. For instance, 
one of the interviewed ARTS professors recalled that some department heads received awful 
evaluations because managing their position did not leave them time for research or teaching, 
which was not acknowledged in the evaluation process. Different trust positions can also be 
seen as a part of the contribution to the community which did not face so much opposition 
anyhow. 
In short, the professors want a reward system that is simple and would not add to the 
administrative load that is already perceived high and frustrating. They also seem to prefer 
giving rewards at research group rather than individual level, and specifically giving 
additional resources for research groups in order to increase the freedom of research and the 
equitability of the system. At the individual level, short-term or one-time bonuses were not 
supported but neither was not rewarding for performance at all. Instead, salaries reflecting 
performance levels, merit increases, or additional career steps seemed appealing to professors, 
and they were seen as a monetary way of showing appreciation. Recognition at the university 
and school level was considered important, however it was emphasized that only very 
extraordinary and top achievements should be rewarded with awards. What comes to 
performance criteria, elements similar to the existing system arose but the emphasis differ. 
Furthermore, the strong emphasis on administration was highly criticized in the current 
system. 
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5.4.2 Management’s point of view  
A conspicuous finding from the interviews is that there seems to be hardly any conflicts 
amongst the opinions of the university and school managers as well as between the 
management and the professors. This is most likely affected by academic leadership. Thus, 
they are double-agents, so to say: they are closer to being peers to their subordinates than a 
usual, private-sector manager is by being able to identify themselves as professors as well. 
Therefore the goals of the management and the professors are similar to each other, which can 
be seen in the similarity of the opinions regarding rewarding as well. Naturally, there are 
differences between the schools depending on the culture and focus areas of the school in 
question. 
Even though most of the interviewees agreed that a main part of professors’ motivation 
derives from something else than extrinsic, monetary rewards, they did see that rewarding can 
have a role in steering and motivating their performance. In ARTS the role of monetary 
rewards was strongly questioned, however for instance Deans D and F did emphasize the 
importance of rewarding for performance. Some benefits of monetary rewarding that were 
named were recognition of top performance, signaling of strategy through rewarding 
performance that is strategically important (Dean B), and that “especially engineers are very 
straightforward in following outcome measures” (Dean F), which leads to a direct steering 
effect. The differences were indeed biggest between ARTS and the other schools, which can 
be explained by the differences in the nature of the fields and in the history of using or not 
using monetary rewards, however acknowledgement of success was seen vital also within 
ARTS management.  
The main tool that the management identified for steering professors’ actions was providing 
resources for them. It is very similar to what the professors preferred themselves. This comes 
back to providing the professors academic freedom: trusting that they are the right persons to 
decide how to use the resources in the best way and simultaneously fostering their self-
efficacy. This was not, however, seen as individual rewarding but more of a group rewarding 
element: the resources would be given to high-performing research group according to their 
performance. As one of the Aalto-level managers said, resources are a much more motivating 
way to reward than individual bonuses. Furthermore, the same manager said that a way to 
steer the professors’ actions has already traditionally been providing resources for projects 
that are important strategy-wise. Ergo, resources are seen as a better and more efficient way to 
both motivate and steer professors, i.e. what usually are the objectives of monetary incentives.  
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What comes to individual performance-based rewarding, it was seen as an important element 
of motivating, steering, and acknowledging professors in both the university-level 
management and all the other schools except ARTS, yet not the main method. Bonuses or 
short-term incentives, however, did not gain much support by the management either because 
a “bonus received from yearly performance is somehow a troublesome couple with the 
professor’s function” (Top manager B at Aalto level), referring to the multidimensionality and 
long-term nature of professors’ work. Dean F also stated that the multidimensional values of 
the university are extremely difficult to frame as a functional and easily measurable 
instrumentation so that the administrative load would not become excessive. Therefore, a 
more straightforward system of rewarding for performance that takes the different dimensions 
and the long-term nature into account was called for also by the management. Furthermore, 
again all but one Dean favored merit increases better than bonuses. One option to execute 
this was to connect merit increase with more career steps after reaching the Full Professor 
level in order to add goals similar to those in the existing tenure track after the tenure decision 
as well. In ARTS, however, the whole concept of connecting rewarding with performance 
was perceived strange and therefore neither bonuses nor merit increase was seen very 
attractive. 
In addition to providing resources for research groups and supporting a merit-based salary 
system, the management considered recognition as an important element of overall 
rewarding, for instance in the form of awards. This was also seen as a way to create a culture 
that acknowledges the success of others and where celebrating for extraordinary achievements 
is encouraged. Especially ARTS saw the monetary element of recognition or awards as 
secondary, the main purpose being in making success visible and known to the community. 
This would be a direct way of steering the professors: rewarding for successful performance 
that is in accordance with Aalto’s strategy and this way making it visible which kind of 
performance is encouraged. It is also a way of creating supportive extrinsic rewards and 
consequently creating a crowding-in effect. 
The management interviews also covered the level of centralization on which the rewarding 
would be managed. There was a consensus that the structure of the reward system should be 
the same in all the schools; however, it was emphasized that the differences between the 
schools should be taken into account. This would be the easiest to do by giving the tools for 
each school to use but allowing different ways of using them. For instance, different aspects 
or criteria could vary and be given different weighs or different kinds of achievements could 
 66  
 
be rewarded by recognition awards, depending on the current strategic needs of each school. 
Yet these different emphases would have frames that were defined at the university level. 
Especially the basic principles of the merit system should be the same as “it would feel 
strange if they were not” (Top manager A at Aalto level). With rewards, the differences 
between schools can be better taken into account and more flexibility allowed. 
What the management also pointed out is that the system should allow specialization in one 
area of work and should not punish for being a top researcher or top teacher, for instance. 
Furthermore, at the moment most if not all of the tenure decisions are based on research 
achievements and do not take achievements in teaching or service to the university into 
account. It was also called for that these aspects of professors’ work would be given a 
stronger emphasis on and specialization in them would be encouraged. It might be difficult to 
do that with a completely objective system that is based on exact measures. On the other 
hand, if a subjective element is included, especially in a merit system, there might be a danger 
that the increase would be granted based on the supervisor’s personal preferences instead of 
performance. Furthermore, other problems of subjective evaluation that the managers 
identified are that subjective evaluation is difficult and determining who would be the one 
deciding about it is problematic in itself. There is also a possibility that tensions at work 
would increase if evaluation was mainly subjective and there were no objective criteria that 
could be used to motivate the decisions. 
To conclude, both the professors and the management clearly preferred similar elements to be 
included in the overall reward system, them being merit increase or further career steps after 
the promotion to Full Professor for individuals; additional resources for well-performing 
research groups; and different recognition elements such as awards in order to mace success 
visible inside the schools and the university. In the following chapter, I will introduce my 
proposal for the new reward system based on these findings, including the structure of the 
system as well as some criteria on which the rewards should be based.  
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6 NEW REWARD SYSTEM 
In Chapter 6.1 I will introduce a proposal for the new reward system. It is based on the 
analysis in the previous chapter as well as the suggestions of the steering group members for 
their own schools. Even though the data used in the thesis and the project are the same and the 
discussions within the project team are used as complementary data in this thesis, the model 
that I propose is different from that of the actual project. This is mainly because the project 
continued after the completion of the thesis and therefore the final model cannot be described 
here.  
The proposal will first take a stand on the elements of which the system consists. After that, I 
will take a closer look at each of the elements and describe how they would be used. The 
suggestion is at the university level; however, I will discuss how they can be varied at the 
school levels and how the different preferences can be taken into account. Chapter 6.2 
consists of the discussion and links the model with the theory. 
6.1 New system 
6.1.1 Rewarding elements 
Based on the analysis in the previous chapters, the elements of the new system seem rather 
straightforward. Both the professors and the management are rather unanimous that, besides 
the fixed salary, there should be a system of merit increases. In addition, rewarding research 
groups for their achievements was considered extremely important, and this was suggested to 
be done through allocating additional resources for well-performing research groups. They 
can also be granted for individuals if research is mainly done individually. Finally, especially 
the management raised other recognition for extraordinary achievements as an important 
rewarding element. An important notion about the elements is that they should not be fixed 
but can be updated if changes in strategy or the environment require different emphasis. 
Because they are supported by the majority of the organization, the proposal of the overall 
reward system is built around these three elements. Together they form a reward system that 
rewards individual professors for their long-term performance, give additional resources for 
either groups or individuals according to their performance and therefore increases their 
autonomy, and make excelling accomplishments both recognized and visible to others. 
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However, because the differences between the schools have been raised in different contexts
11
 
it is natural that some variation in rewarding between the schools is allowed. While the 
structure of the system is good to be the same in all the schools, the differences can be taken 
into account by changing the emphasis of different elements. Furthermore, it should be 
allowed for the schools to modify the criteria as well as include a subjective ‘common sense’ 
factor in order to achieve a holistic picture. 
Merit increase 
First of all, two options for linking salaries to performance emerged in the data: it was 
suggested either a merit increase system to be introduced or the current Tenure Track (Figure 
4, page 39) to be extended so that there were further career steps after reaching the Full 
Professor level and therefore being tenured. For both of the options, the reasoning was that 
there were no formal steps after reaching the Full Professor level, and further goals could be 
introduced by either means. The mechanism for both of the options looks very similar: there 
are certain criteria to be fulfilled and when that happens, a merit-based salary increase or a 
promotion shall be given. The difference seems to be more in the way these steps are 
communicated and implemented: in the case of merit increases, the salary raises are not 
visible to others but if there are further career steps for Full Professors, they are visible to the 
whole community through the title. Furthermore, formal career steps would require more 
administrative efforts whereas merit increase would be lighter to implement. 
Because one goal of the new system is to keep the level of administration as low as possible, 
merit increase is a better option than formal career steps. Furthermore, if many visible career 
steps are added to the current system (e.g. Full Professor 1, 2, 3, 4…), it might undermine the 
perceived value of these steps and therefore decrease the desired motivational effects
12
. The 
merit increase would be a rewarding element for the top performers so in order to keep it that 
way, it should be clearly distinctive from the regular salary raises that are negotiated 
individually under normal circumstances. This way a situation where the majority of the 
professors remains with low salaries while a small part reaches high salaries would be 
avoided and the merit increase would still keep its status as a reward for exceptional 
achievements. 
                                                 
11
 E.g. by the management, in the steering group meetings, by the professors 
12
 See Formula (2) from expectancy-valence theory: M = E x V (p. 21) 
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When merit increase is chosen as the rewarding element that takes long-term individual 
performance into account, the process of giving the increase should be determined. First of 
all, each professor applies the increase individually in order to maintain a low level of 
administration. This way there would be no need to create a formal regular evaluation process 
that covers all the professors. Any Full Professor that performs highly could apply for the 
increase based on certain pre-set, indicative performance levels that cover the different core 
performance areas: research, education, and impact. The performance levels would be set in 
each school in a way that they are reached with extraordinary performance, and if the pre-set 
criteria are met, an increase of an agreed percentage of the current salary will be granted. The 
general performance criteria should be the same for all the schools in order to create integrity 
that the management called for but the exact measures and measure levels should be 
determined at the school level because the best knowledge of the work is in the schools. This 
way the system would be easy to communicate, clear to everyone, and a certain level of 
objectiveness would be included in order to keep it fair. The criteria will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6.1.2.  
The merit increases should not be revised too often because professors’ merits are long-term 
in nature. The management was quite unanimous that a proper time frame for merit increase 
would be 3-5 years. However, it would feel somewhat artificial if the review was done even 
on three-year regular basis if in some cases there was no progress and in others the progress 
was much faster. Therefore, the performance levels for an increase should be set so that on 
average, a professor meets them in a 3-year time frame with extraordinary performance and 
whenever the criteria are met, the professor can apply for the increase themselves. However, 
the levels have to be high enough to ensure that the increase is a reward for exceptional 
achievements. The application process could be done in connection with the yearly 
development discussions so that there would not be major additions to the administrative load 
of the decision-makers. If the check-up shows that the criteria are met, the corresponding 
increase will be granted. The final decision level would be logically set to be at the school 
level and the increase to be decided by the Dean of the school eventually since they have the 
responsibility for the school’s budget (Dean F).  
Additional resources 
The second element of overall rewarding that was supported by the majority of the 
respondents and the management was additional resources. It was called differently in 
different schools and by different individuals but the basic idea behind the resources was the 
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same: instead of a bonus given to an individual perhaps due to performance that is affected by 
several other individuals, the ‘bonus’ should be given to a research unit instead in the form of 
additional resources. A research unit is often a group but in some schools it can be an 
individual professor as well. Resources were referred to as monetary or material components 
or non-monetary elements that allow more flexibility and opportunities for research, for 
instance hiring more people to the research group, e.g. a post doc; new equipment; or time for 
research, i.e. research leave or less administration taking time from research. The resources 
would be applied as well in order to avoid having to evaluate every research group or 
researcher separately. 
While this would not the element that primarily rewards individuals for their long-term, 
holistic performance but one that rewards a unit that is creating concrete outcomes, whether it 
was a research group or an individual professor doing research, the time frame of granting 
additional resources can be shorter than that of the merit increase. The assessment of the 
performance of the units in question would be done by yearly assessment in each school. The 
units, again, are the most logical to define at the school level while the schools know their 
natural units. Furthermore, the Dean would assess the top performers based on reviews from 
the departments and grant them with relevant, additional resources. Top performers can be 
determined in each school based on certain criteria which will be discussed in the next chapter 
as well. 
The allocation of resources would be done through a resource bank that each school has for 
this purpose; this because the Dean again has the budgetary responsibility and should 
therefore have the control as well. Also because taking the decision-making at the entire 
university level would increase undesirable bureaucracy and diminish the autonomy and 
academic freedom of the schools. Furthermore, the emphasis is on the word additional: it has 
to be clear that the resources are not taken from other units but are purely complementary 
instead. This avoids creating harmful competition and frustration among other academics. 
However, there could be a resource bank at Aalto level in addition to the school-specific 
resource banks. In this case the resources would be allocated by Aalto-level management and 
granted for outcomes that are significant for the university as a whole. 
Recognition 
As for rewarding for extraordinary, one-time achievements, a system of making them visible 
to the whole community was called for especially by the management but also by many of the 
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professors. It was acknowledged that a culture of celebrating success is missing in Finland 
and in Aalto, which was also visible in the professors’ answers: they are not very familiar 
with these kinds of acknowledgements. However, the majority of the management was hoping 
to create such culture and to have a recognition element to create a supportive environment. In 
addition, by making certain outcomes and achievements visible it is possible to give signals 
about what kind of performance is desired.  
Recognition of exceptional accomplishments is an efficient way to avoid the time-discounting 
problem. Recognition can be done in shorter periods of time and therefore be closer to the 
performance than longer-term performance-based rewarding. It can also be done at different 
organizational levels: for instance, it was suggested that extremely noteworthy achievements 
that are strategically important for the whole university and significant for the whole scientific 
community should be rewarded at Aalto level (ELEC professor). These rewards would be 
granted by the President or the Provost of Aalto. Additionally, other successes that might be 
significant school- or department-wise were to be rewarded at the school level where the 
Dean would be the one making the decisions. The former could be done on yearly basis while 
the latter can be done more often, e.g. twice or four times a year or even continuously, 
depending on the need. The recognition could include a small monetary element but the main 
value for the rewarded would arise from appreciation of one’s work. 
Since this would be an element recognizing one-time successes, the subject for rewarding 
could be either an individual staff member or a group that has reached an exceptional 
outcome. The individual can be a professor regardless of the status or other staff member such 
as a lecturer since a “bonus system where only professors are reward[ed] harms team spirit 
and is clearly unfair to other personnel groups” (SCI professor). Therefore it should not be 
limited to Full Professors only because in that case, over a third of the professors (see Table 3, 
page 39) and even more of the other personnel would be excluded and possible negative 
effects could arise due to inequity aversion.  
The summary of the three elements of the proposed system described above can be found in 
Table 9, including the target of the rewarding element, the time frame, the decision levels, and 
the process of rewarding of each element. The criteria for the different elements are described 
next. 
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Table 9: Proposed reward system 
A summary of the elements in the new reward system and their time frames and decision levels. 
 
Merit increase Resources Recognition 
Who are 
rewarded 
Individual (Full) 
professor 
Research group 
(or individual) 
Individual 
professor (all 
levels) or group  
Individual 
professor (all 
levels) or group  
Time frame Every 3 years Yearly 
A few times a 
year or 
continuously 
Yearly or 
continuously 
Decision level 
School 
(Dean from Dept 
head’s proposal) 
School 
(Dean from Dept 
head’s proposal) 
School 
(Dean)  
Aalto 
(President or 
Provost) 
 
6.1.2  Rewarding criteria 
Merit increase  
What comes to the criteria regarding merit increase, the evaluation would start principally on 
objective criteria in order to maintain the comprehensibility and transparency of the system 
that was important especially for the professors. For the same reason, it is important that the 
criteria is known ex ante. Objective criteria would also help the professors to understand what 
is required to get the increase and therefore make the motivational and steering effects more 
distinct. However, I would include a holistic subjective element in the evaluation because of 
the multidimensionality and the qualitative aspects of academic work. The measures should 
reflect the strategy and KPI’s of Aalto (Lawler & Jenkins, 1992; Table 5, page 45), which 
makes it reasonable to include measures from the strategic areas: research excellence, pioneer 
in education, trend-setting art, and societal impact. Nonetheless, if there is something to learn 
from the criticism towards the current system, it is that the professors did not appreciate the 
fact that they had to perform evenly well in each performance area and that an exceptional 
contribution to one area was not acknowledged. To take this into account, the increase could 
be given primarily based on performance on one or some of the areas of work (research and 
artistic activities, education, and impact) and the other areas would be evaluated holistically.  
As the measures for merit increase look rather clear based on the opinions of the management 
and the professors (for the latter see Table 8, page 61), the most preferred measures should be 
included: publication quality and quantity, thesis supervision, and teaching, at the fewest. 
Whether to include measures for administration and external funding is a more complex 
problem: administration because it was generally considered as part of the job description and 
thus not as something that should be rewarded separately; and external funding because even 
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though it is important to the university and research and certain professors spend a significant 
amount of their time acquiring it, it is technically an input rather than a performance output.  
As for the measures regarding research, artistic activities, and education, the current measures 
seem to be fine with the majority if the complex calculation models are abandoned. Therefore 
publication quality and quantity can be measured by the number of publications in quality 
forums, the forums being identified within schools because different fields have different 
measures for quality. Artistic activity can be measured likewise, the measure being the 
number of reviewed artistic productions. For education, thesis supervision is a preferred and 
reasonable measure but does not reflect teaching quality much. Therefore, it is justified to 
include student feedback as an indicator together with the number of Master’s and Doctoral 
thesis supervised while it signals teaching quality quite directly. Additionally, teaching 
quality reached an average of 3.32 among professors when asking about the preferred criteria 
(Table 8). It would also cover the lack of teaching in the current (and the former TKK) 
system, which was mentioned as a shortcoming in the survey. 
Because administration is generally seen as a part of the job description, there should not be 
additional salary for doing it and therefore it should not be included in the merit increase 
criteria. Because of that, it should be left out even though professors’ motivation to do 
administrative tasks was low, 2.45 on average (see Chart 1 on page 47 for school-specific 
motivation averages), which would indicate that an extrinsic motivator could be justified for 
administrative tasks. On the other hand, different positions are often compensated separately, 
which should give sufficient extrinsic reward for these tasks, and no further reward should be 
given. It can also be discussed whether the motivation to do administrative tasks should be 
increased at all since it is not in the essence of professors’ work anyhow. It does not seem 
sensible to motivate professors to perform tasks that will not eventually bring additional value 
to the implementation of strategy. 
However, some professors can devote a significant amount of their time for developing the 
university and thus contribute to its strategic goals. This kind of impactful contribution to the 
university could be taken into account in the merit increase together with significant 
contribution to the society and it can include having certain positions within the university. 
Here again the output, significant contribution, is the key, not only being in a certain position. 
Significant contribution could be for instance not only working as a Department Head while it 
is also paid separately but substantially developing and advancing the department while 
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working as a Department Head. Here as well as with contribution to the society, extraordinary 
output is a key and some subjectivity cannot be avoided while there are no relevant 
quantitative measures for developing the university environment. 
External funding is an even more complex question because professors are used to getting 
rewarded for acquiring it as it has traditionally had a significant role in the bonus system 
especially in TKK. However, it is not exactly a performance output even though it is crucial 
for the university. If it was not compensated, some professors stated that they would 
substantially decrease the efforts that they have put in it, which could have negative effects on 
the university as a whole. Therefore, I would not include it in the application criteria but it can 
be taken into account when assessing the professors’ holistic performance after the 
application is received.  
Figure 6 presents the performance areas that determine the merit increase criteria. The 
primary criteria that were explained above are consequently assigned to each performance 
area. The circles indicate the relationship between different types of performance: principally, 
the increase can be given according to performance within one area, for example research, but 
it also possible to gain by different combinations of work. That way specialization will be 
allowed as hoped by the professors but also extraordinary performance throughout the whole 
work scale of professors will be recognized.  
Figure 6: Performance areas and respective criteria for merit increase 
 
Research 
•No of quality publications 
Artistic 
activity 
•No of 
reviewed 
productions 
Impact 
•Significant 
contribution 
to the 
university/ 
society 
Education 
•No of thesis 
supervisions 
(Master and 
Doctoral) 
•Student 
feedback 
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Additional resources 
Since additional resources for research are basically a way to reward top-performing research 
units (individuals or research groups) by granting resources for the unit, they should be 
allocated for the top-performing units within each school. Therefore, the allocation criteria 
should be decided in each school for the same reasons as those of the merit increase: the 
knowledge of what is good performance is in the schools. The criteria could include e.g. 
published (quality) papers or a scientific breakthrough. Furthermore, it would be logical to 
reward the units for the external funding they acquire by giving them better premises to 
conduct their research. Therefore, external funding could be included in the criteria for 
granting additional resources as well. Since the resources in the resource bank would be 
limited, I would grant the additional resources for a certain number of the best research units 
based on the criteria and with a necessary amount of subjectivity. The number of the rewarded 
units would be determined when the available resources are known so that the value of the 
reward will be meaningful and that way have a motivational effect.  
Recognition 
For the recognition element, certain measures should not be defined because one-time 
achievements with different profiles can be very extraordinary. Instead, there could be verbal 
criteria defining what is classified extraordinary. Yet the Dean would have the main decision 
making power for the school-level recognition and the President or Provost for the Aalto-level 
recognition and they would use mainly subjective criteria based on their judgement and the 
current strategic need also. The recognition would, anyhow, acknowledge achievements in all 
the strategic areas without forgetting societal impact or administrative contribution which 
have been neglected historically. This would also be an excellent channel to reward for 
internalization and interdisciplinarity while they are in the core of Aalto’s strategy but 
extremely difficult to measure by objective, numerical measures.  
6.2 Discussion 
The analysis of the case organization confirms the same observation as many scholars 
studying public sector organizations have discovered: New Public Management has found its 
way to universities (Pollitt, 1995). This is clearly visible through the linkage from the 
governmental regulations to an individual professor’s performance evaluation in Aalto 
University. The linkage starts from the Universities Act and continues through the 
universities’ Funding Model, the contract between the Ministry of Education and Culture all 
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the way to Aalto University’s internal Funding Model and performance measures. 
Consequently, managerial practices seem to be something that the university staff has to live 
with. Even though NPM has been heavily criticized by academics (e.g. Sehested, 2002) and 
many Aalto professors perceived incentive systems as a hostile way to control their work, I 
think that positive effects can be gained from it if the adaptation of the practices is done in a 
way that respects professors as professionals. 
One of the reasons why many of the Aalto professors are strongly against short-term bonuses 
seems to be the poor execution of the current incentive system. It is a good example of 
interpreting NPM too literally and not transferring the practices to the context properly. When 
models and practices that work in corporate organizations are transferred into the public 
world as such, the effects are most likely not the same as in private organizations (Sehested, 
2002). In the case of Aalto, the top management was formed from corporate leaders with little 
experience in the academic world when it was founded. This is probably one reason why the 
adaptation did not succeed very well and the professors are extremely dissatisfied and 
frustrated with the bonus system. However, I would not say that NPM by definition is evil but 
its wrong implementation causes problems. Many professors did express that they do want to 
be rewarded but even a stronger opinion was that the current system as such does not bring 
benefits to anybody. The fact that even those professors who had received a bonus from the 
current system were extremely dissatisfied with it highlights the problems of the system even 
more. 
One of the most prominent features of professors as agents is that they are motivated agents 
(Besley & Ghatak, 2005). The survey results in this study fully confirm this statement as the 
motivation averages reached extremely high levels with especially research, teaching, and 
artistic activities within ARTS (Chart 1, page 47). Even though the other tasks might not have 
reached as high motivation levels, it does not mean that professors would not be motivated. 
On the contrary, they are motivated to do the things that are in the essence of their work. As 
the motivation drivers indicated, the high motivation levels are primarily due to high intrinsic 
motivation with respect to the core tasks. Therefore it can be concluded that professors are 
primarily driven by intrinsic motivators such as curiosity, science itself, a constant drive to do 
research, love of knowledge, and simply joy. They might also be motivated by external 
motivators such as rewards but to a lesser extent. 
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Another peculiarity in the principal-agent relationship between professors and university 
management is that their interests are closer to each other than in traditional private sector 
corporations (Besley & Ghatak, 2005). This arises partly from the fact that professors are 
motivated agents and have chosen a career where they can fulfil their ambitions. Besides that, 
also the management seems to be closer to the interests of professors because of academic 
leadership (Ramsden et  al., 2007). This was clearly visible in the interviews: the management 
had extremely similar ideas to those of the professors, based on both the survey and the 
opinions expressed by the professor members of the steering group. All of the interviewed 
management representatives did indeed have a professor background and many of them also 
expressed it in the interviews. Therefore it can be concluded that there is so-called natural 
alignment from two directions in the professor-management relationship: on one hand 
alignment that derives from the professors being motivated agents and on the other alignment 
that is due to academic leadership. 
Because of professors’ high intrinsic motivation, the effects of rewarding on overall 
motivation should be considered. The worst case scenario would be that the reward system 
causes crowding-out (Frey & Jegen, 2001), yet the optimal scenario, crowding in, is 
challenging to achieve with such high motivation levels especially in research. It could be 
possible in other areas of work where motivation still has reserves to increase but it seems a 
good goal in itself to have a system that maintains the high level of intrinsic motivation, 
especially when NPM is already entrenched in the organization. The current system seems to 
have caused crowding out, at least judging on the professors’ comments. One factor that 
might have even strengthened the negative effect for many professors is the drastic change 
from the high bonus levels in the TKK system to the rather insignificant levels in the Aalto 
system. Therefore the crowding-out effect is a consequence of impaired self-esteem (ibid.) 
while professors perceived the decrease in total compensation as a decreased appreciation of 
their work. 
Another clear finding from the survey was the high level of inequity aversion that prevailed 
strongly among Aalto professors. The statement of Englmaier and Wambach (2010) that 
paying equitably within an organization is an effective incentive instrument was confirmed by 
the survey. It was most visible in the opinions about the fact that a professors’ personal bonus 
is paid from the department’s money and thus decreases the resources for other activities in 
the faculty. It was found that even the professors who had received a bonus were not satisfied 
with the system and probably experienced a decrease in their personal motivation because 
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they found the redistribution inequitable. It was also perceived inequitable that only certain 
professors were eligible to the bonus while the results that they were rewarded for were often 
an achievement of a whole research group. Therefore many professors felt strongly for 
rewarding the whole research group instead of only one individual from the group. Giving 
additional resources was a preferred way to reward research units, groups or individuals. It is 
reasonable because of both of the arguments above: firstly, even though departments’ money 
was distributed as a reward, it would eventually contribute to the community in the form of 
new research. Secondly, the reward would be given to all the individuals that contributed to 
the output. It is also a rational way to allocate funds while the most productive research units 
will more probably be productive in the future as well.  
As inequity averse individuals may experience a decrease in their intrinsic motivation as a 
result of inequitable rewarding, reward systems can cause crowding out in other ways as well. 
Professors highlighted that a system that limits their work too much is highly demotivating 
and that a system that is more guiding than controlling is more preferable. Such system goes 
in line with the ways to avoid impaired self-determination: by highlighting the informative 
aspects of the reward system rather than trying to control the employees supports self-
determination and consequently intrinsic motivation (Deci, 1980). Similarly, many of the 
professors expressed that for them, acknowledging their achievements by the school or 
university is much more rewarding than receiving monetary compensation which was in many 
cases seen hostile. These findings support the literature that argues that money often decreases 
intrinsic motivation while positive feedback increases it (Frey & Jegen, 2001).  
The three elements of rewarding that construct the holistic reward system introduced in 
chapter 6.1 form an entity that support professors’ self-determination and consequently 
intrinsic motivation by supporting their autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000a). Merit increase is an individual reward for a professor and the objective 
performance levels set personal goals for Full Professors after getting tenured. The criteria 
should be designed to give information about what kind of performance is desired in order to 
maintain professors’ autonomy over their work and consequently their intrinsic motivation. 
Reaching the objective goal and receiving the increase supports the feeling of competence, in 
turn. The recognition element increases the feeling of relating to the university and the school 
by bringing out successes and making them visible to the whole community. Additional 
resources for research units contribute directly to the autonomy over work by giving the unit 
decision power over the resource, whether it was equipment, research leave, or a new Post-
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Doctoral student. This way the elements that both the professors and the management 
identified complement each other in terms of supporting intrinsic motivation. 
Of the three elements, recognition supports self-efficacy by setting example and providing 
social verbal persuasion (Staples;Hulland;& Higgins, 1998) while the idea is to make success 
visible to the whole organization. It also helps reducing the time-discounting problem because 
it can be given within shorter periods of time. However, the long-term nature of professors’ 
work will be taken into account in the merit increase more naturally while the cycle of the 
increase cannot be very short, otherwise it would become administratively insupportable.  
Especially what comes to merit increase and recognition, expectancy-valence theory ought to 
be taken into account. If we look at the motivation formula (2) of expectancy-valence theory 
(Kominis & Emmanuel, 2007; page 21), it can be seen why the existing model did not add to 
motivation: professors’ expectancy of how probably they will achieve the goals was low since 
reaching excellence in all the areas is extremely difficult. This, consequently, lowers the 
factorial, motivation. The other element, valence, also influences overall motivation and 
should therefore be set at a level that is high enough to at least maintain motivation. This 
explains why the motivational effect of the Aalto system remained low for many professors: 
they did not see fulfilling all the criteria very probable – low expectancy – and they did not 
perceive the value worth enough to be properly motivated by it. Thus, allowing specialization 
with the merit increase criteria does not decrease the expectancy levels and setting the merit 
increase high enough to have significance should both contribute positively to overall 
motivation. The significance of the value of the additional resources has a similar effect. 
With allowing specialization another common problem in performance measurement in 
multidimensional organizations can be avoided as well: how to include all the aspects of work 
in the measurement system (Baker et al., 1988). Based on the survey, Aalto professors are 
strongly opposing a system where everything is measured. It can be asked if all the aspects 
have to be included in the first place, especially when an organization has a possibility to 
build its strength by bringing together people with different strengths and specialization areas. 
That way requiring excellence in all the possible aspects of work is not even necessary for the 
organization as a whole. The university should definitely not transfer its KPIs to an individual 
professors’ evaluation and rewarding criteria, not because they are impossible to fulfil as a 
whole and not because many of them are university- of school-wide and thus are not under the 
control of an individual professor or a research unit. It is important for the motivational 
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effects that the rewarding criteria are under the control of the professor (Lawler, 2003), which 
the professors emphasized as well. 
When Aalto professors expressed their opinions about how the new reward system should be, 
simplicity, clarity, transparency, and fairness were by far the most favored qualities that the 
system should have. These characteristics are not surprising while they are often considered 
as the conditions for a successful reward system, at least in knowledge-intensive firms (Van 
Herpen et al., 2005). 
If we look at the theoretical framework of this study, all of the relationships presented in 
Figure 3 are supported by the empirical data. The management interviews confirmed that one 
of the goals set to rewarding is communicating Aalto’s strategy as well as affect their 
motivation. It was also clear that professors have their own goals especially with regard to 
their research and that they want to strive for these goals. Hence, their intrinsic motivation 
wells from their personal goals. There was also a linkage between professors’ extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation which was particularly visible in the opinions about the current Aalto 
system: as it was perceived highly demotivating, it indicates that at least in some cases, 
crowding out occurred. 
The new reward system attempts to maintain professors’ intrinsic motivation through 
fostering both their self-efficacy and self-determination. The former is done by emphasizing 
success and creating a culture where achievements are verbally acknowledged through 
recognition. The latter, in turn, is done by the system as a whole: by supporting professors’ 
autonomy, competence, and relatedness, as was stated above. With regard to extrinsic 
motivation, a way to avoid crowding out is to pay attention to inequity aversion: by making 
the system fair and equitable, the harmful effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation 
can be minimized. 
The original framework is revisited in Figure 7. Rewarding is further specified and replaced 
by the three elements that were found to support professors’ intrinsic motivation, and more 
precisely the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, the 
motivation crowding relationship between the two types of motivations was added in the 
original framework because it is influenced by the rewarding elements to a great extent. 
Consequently, motivation crowding affects the balance between extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation and similarly the overall level of motivation.  
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In addition to the important role that motivation plays in the framework, it seems that 
rewarding can be extended to affect professors’ opportunities as well (see Formula (1), page 
17). This is done by giving additional resources for the top performers. More interestingly, it 
appears that advancing professors’ opportunities by providing them more resources enhances 
their motivation as well. This might result from inequity aversion in professors’ case: by 
rewarding all those who contributed to the outputs and giving them more opportunities to 
carry out their personal goals the reward is perceived more equitable. Therefore, I would 
suggest introducing two additional connections in the framework: a connection between the 
agent’s opportunities and motivation as well as resources and opportunities. Since resources 
were seen as such an important form of rewarding by professors, it can be assumed to have a 
positive effect on professors’ overall motivation even though the managers did not necessarily 
even consider it as a reward.  
Figure 7: Revisited framework 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis was to design a new, holistic reward system for Aalto University. 
More specifically, the research question concerned rewarding professors based on their 
performance in order to maintain their intrinsic motivation and to create external motivators 
to perform towards the university’s strategic goals. In order to design a contextually suitable 
reward system, two secondary objectives for the thesis were defined: finding out what drives 
professors’ motivation and what kind of rewarding supports their intrinsic motivation. The 
research was approached through combining three theoretical fields: public sector research, 
motivation theories, and rewarding literature. The context was created by using public sector 
literature and especially the concept of New Public Management. While it seemed evident 
that professors’ performance is affected by their motivation and specifically intrinsic 
motivation to a great extent, Behavioral Agency Theory was chosen to link different 
motivation theories and human behavior to performance. Finally, different ways of rewarding 
were assessed in the academic context to illustrate what the rewarding mix can consist of and 
which ways of rewarding seem most suitable for professors in terms of motivational effects. 
The empirical research was conducted as a case study in Aalto University and the data was 
collected principally by a survey to Aalto’s professors and eight interviews of management 
representatives as well as two ARTS professors. The survey was chosen because it was 
important to include the professors in the preparation phase and get their perceptions as 
comprehensively as possible. Therefore it was sent out to all the professors at Aalto; it would 
not have been possible to reach the same level of information with interviews only and 
simultaneously give every professor the chance to contribute with their opinions. It was also 
important to find out the management’s objectives for rewarding. Interviews were chosen as 
the most suitable method because it was easy to identify which managers provided the 
information needed for the study and interviews gave them more freedom to express their 
opinions. 
The data provided rich findings about the opinions of Aalto University’s professors as well as 
the management and they were found to support the theoretical assumptions. It was apparent 
that professors are intrinsically driven to do their work, especially research, as was expected 
(Chen et al., 2006). They were motivated to teach and interact with society as these are part of 
what is in the essence of professors’ work. The dissatisfaction towards the current incentive 
system at Aalto University arose mainly from its complexity, perceived inequitability, and 
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opaqueness. The dissatisfaction seemed to cause crowding out (e.g. Ryan & Deci, 2000a) for 
several professors based on their responses. They requested a system that is fair and available 
for all [Full] professors and would not cause harmful competition and reward only one person 
for the achievements of a larger group. 
As a result of the analysis, a reward system was constructed for Aalto University. The system 
consists of three parts: merit increases, additional resources for research units, and 
recognition, and these parts were supported by both the professors and the management. 
These elements support professors’ self-determination (Ryan & Deci, 2000b) together and 
take the different challenges of evaluating and rewarding multidimensional and qualitative 
work into account: time-discounting problem (Steel & König, 2006) is avoided by recognition 
that can be provided in a shorter time frame while the long-term nature of professors’ work is 
included in the merit increase. Assessing the quality of work is done through introducing 
subjective evaluation to support the objective criteria. Another important feature of the system 
is that it should promote a culture of empowering professors and especially celebrating and 
acknowledging success and extraordinary achievements within the whole university. This can 
be done by emphasizing the informing aspect instead of that of the controlling when 
communicating the system (Deci, 1980).  
What comes to the goals and incentives of the university and the professors, the analysis 
showed that their opinions are indeed close to each other. Therefore the traditional agency 
problem (Tosi et al., 1997) is smaller than in corporations: the professors’ and the 
management’s goals are quite well aligned. The research seems to support at least two 
possible reasons for the alignment: firstly, professors are motivated agents (Besley & Ghatak, 
2005) and the majority of the management has a professor background themselves and thus 
understand both points of view. It was also found that professors can also be motivated by 
external interventions, yet they do not always want to be or think that they are. What was 
surprising was that even though it was known that the opportunities professors have affect 
their overall performance (Pepper & Gore, 2012), it seems that they contribute to their 
motivation as well, and specifically intrinsic motivation. Related to the opportunities, it was 
somewhat surprising that the professors rated additional resources as the most preferred 
element of rewarding even though further resources bring more responsibilities as well. It was 
also unexpected that over 70 % of the professors thought a bonus system is needed, even 
though the result can be partly explained by the different ways of understanding the concept 
of bonus. 
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Even though the overall response rate of the survey was good, 30.5 %, the low response rates 
in some schools, especially ARTS, decreases the reliability of certain conclusions from the 
school-specific data. This problem was tried to be solved by conducting two additional 
interviews in ARTS; however, the results are not fully as reliable as with a higher response 
rate. Another factor that might bias the results of the survey is that it might have attracted 
those professors to answer who are the most dissatisfied with the current situation and want to 
express their resistance towards it. What the thesis does not take a stand on is how the renewal 
of the reward system will eventually work and what kind of effects it will have on the 
professors’ motivation. In an optimal case, the sample would have covered every Full 
Professor in Aalto University in order to avoid any bias; however, this situation would be 
highly unlikely to achieve. Additionally, the management’s point of view could have been 
given more emphasis on even though the primary focus was on the professors. 
For further research, it would be a good topic to assess the realized success of the new model 
and the changes it cases in professors’ motivation after its implementation. Furthermore, it 
would be interesting to study several universities simultaneously and compare universities 
that are using performance-based rewards to those that are not and see if rewards actually 
have a positive effect on performance. In addition, since this thesis concentrated mostly on the 
structure of a reward system, further research could evaluate how to communicate such 
system in order to have positive effects. 
To conclude, this thesis provides a fresh framework for approaching a topic that has on the 
other hand been discussed but that is not yet very diversely researched. The framework 
proved to give a good basis for building a reward system for professors and evaluating its 
effects on their extrinsic and intrinsic motivation and consequently performance. The study 
was conducted with a unique opportunity to collect information about professors’ opinions 
about how they are rewarded at the moment and how they would want to be rewarded, 
knowing that there will most likely be a change in the system and that they can express their 
expectations towards the project. In addition, the results provide insightful information about 
professors’ motivation and how different forms of rewarding would affect it. While specific 
criteria for rewarding might not be very generalizable because they were constructed for the 
case organization, the elements of rewarding and their connection to motivation can be better 
applied at a general level because they were evaluated based on previous literature at a more 
general level.  
 85  
 
REFERENCES 
Aaltio-Marjosola, I. (1999). Casetutkimus metodisena lähestymistapana. Retrieved March 10, 
2014, from www.metodix.com. 
Aalto University. (2014a). About us: Aalto University. Retrieved August 5, 2014, from 
http://www.aalto.fi/en/about/reports_and_statistics/ 
Aalto University. (2014b). Aalto University front page. Retrieved August 5, 2014, from 
http://www.aalto.fi/en/ 
Aalto University. (2014c). Retrieved June 30, 2014, from Tenure Track: 
http://www.aalto.fi/en/about/careers/tenure_track/ 
Aalto University. (2014d). Main principals of the TKK incentive model. Internal Material. 
Received from Hanna Nurmela, February 11, 2014. 
Aalto University. (2014e). Aalto University Strategy. Internal material. Received from Hanna 
Nurmela, March 3, 2014. 
Aalto University Funding Model 2013 and Schedule for Autumn 2012. (2012). 
Aalto University News. (2012). Retrieved March 3, 2014, from Aalto University: 
http://web.aalto.fi/en/current/news/2012-04-02/ 
Adcroft, A., & Willis, R. (2005). The (un)intended outcome of public sector performance 
measurement. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 18(5), 386-400. 
Amabile, T. M. (1993). Motivational synergy: Toward new conceptualizations of intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation in the workplace. Human Resource Management Review, 3(3), 
185-201. 
Ariely, D. (2010). You Are What You Measure. Harvard Business Review, 88(6), 38. 
Bailey, J. G. (1999). Academics' Motivation and Self‐efficacy for Teaching and Research. 
Higher Education research and development, 18(3), 343-359. 
Baker, G. P.;Jensen, M. C.;& Murphy, K. J. (1988). Compensation and incentives: Practice 
vs. theory. The journal of Finance, 43(3), 593-616. 
 86  
 
Bandura, A. (1994). Self-efficacy. In S. Ramachaudran (Ed.), Encyclopedia of human 
behavior (pp. 71-81). New York: Academic Press. 
Bartol, K. M.;& Srivastava, A. (2002). Encouraging knowledge sharing: the role of 
organizational reward systems. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies, 9(1), 
64-76. 
Benabou, R.;& Tirole, J. (2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 70(3), 489-520. 
Berdahl, R. (1990). Academic freedom, autonomy and accountability in British universities. 
Studies in Higher Education, 15(2), 169-180. 
Besley, T.;& Ghatak, M. (2005). Competition and incentives with motivated agents. 
American economic review, 95(3), 616-636. 
Bess, J. L. (1998). Contract Systems, Bureaucracies, and Faculty Motivation: The Probable 
Effects of a No-Tenure Policy. Journal of Higher Education, 69(1), 1-22. 
Blaxter, L.;Hughes, C.;& Tight, M. (1998). Writing on academic careers. Studies in Higher 
Education, 23(3), 281-295. 
Bonner, S. E.;& Sprinkle, G. B. (2002). The effects of monetary incentives on effort and task 
performance: theories, evidence, and a framework for research. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 27, 303–345. 
Buelens, M.;& Van den Broeck, H. (2007). An analysis of differences in work motivation 
between public and private sector organizations. Public Administration Review, 67(1), 
65-74. 
Carmichael, H. L. (1988). Incentives in academics: Why is there tenure? Journal of political 
Economy, 96(3), 453-72. 
Chen, Y.;Gupta, A.;& Hoshower, L. (2006). Factors that motivate business faculty to conduct 
research: An expectancy theory analysis. Journal of Education for Business, 81(4), 
179-189. 
 87  
 
Chenhall, R. H.;& Langfield-Smith, K. (2003). Performance measurement and reward 
systems, trust, and strategic change. Journal of management accounting research, 
15(1), 117-143. 
Clark, B. R. (1998). The entrepreneurial university: Demand and response 1. Tertiary 
Education & Management, 4(1), 5-16. 
Cole, S.;& Cole, J. R. (1967). Scientific output and recognition: A study in the operation of 
the reward system in science. American sociological review, 377-390. 
Contract between Minedu and Aalto University 2013-2016. (2012). Retrieved February 12, 
2014, from Ministry of Education and Culture: 
http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Koulutus/yliopistokoulutus/hallinto_ohjaus_ja_rahoitus/yl
yliopistoj_tulossopimukset/?lang=fi 
Deci, E. L. (1971). Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 18(1), 105-115. 
Deci, E. L. (1980). The psychology of self-determination. Lexington, Massachusettes: D. C. 
Heath and Company. 
Denman, B. D. (2005). What is a University in the 21st Century? Higher education 
Management and policy, 17(2), 9-26. 
Dixit, A. (2002). Incentives and organizations in the public sector: An interpretative review. 
Journal of human resources, 37(4), 696-727. 
Eccles, J. S.;& Wigfield, A. (2002). Motivational beliefs, values, and goals. Annual review of 
psychology, 53(1), 109-132. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989a). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of 
management review, 14(1), 57-74. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989b). Building Theories from Case Study Research. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4), 532–550. 
Englmaier, F.;& Wambach, A. (2010). Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion. 
Games and Economic Behavior, 69(2), 312-328. 
 88  
 
Fehr, E.;& Falk, A. (2002). Psychological foundations of incentives. European Economic 
Review, 46(4), 687-724. 
Fehr, E.;& Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. The 
quarterly journal of economics, 114(3), 817-868. 
Frey, B. S.;& Jegen, R. (2001). Motivation crowding theory. Journal of economic surveys, 
15(5), 589-611. 
Fryer, K.;Antony, J.;& Ogden, S. (2009). Performance management in the public sector. 
International Journal of Public Sector Management, 22(6), 478-498. 
Gerhart, B.;Milkovich, G.;& & Murray, B. (1992). Pay, performance and participation. 
Teoksessa D. Lewin;O. Mitchell;& P. Sherer (Toim.), Research frontiers in industrial 
relations and human resources. Madison, WI: IRRA. 
Geuna, A.;& Martin, B. R. (2003). University research evaluation and funding: an 
international comparison. Minerva, 41(4), 277-304. 
Gibbs, M.;Merchant, K. A.;van der Stede, W. A.;& Vargus, M. E. (2004). Determinants and 
effects of subjectivity in incentives. The Accounting Review, 79(2), 409-436. 
Gomez‐Mejia, L. R. (1992). Structure and process of diversification, compensation strategy, 
and firm performance. Strategic management journal, 13(5), 381-397. 
Gomez-Mejia, L.;& Wiseman, R. M. (1997). Reframing Execufive Compensation: An 
Assessment and Outlook. Journal of Management, 23(3), 291-374. 
Graham, S.;& Weiner, B. (1996). Theories and principles of motivation. Handbook of 
educational psychology, 4, 63-84. 
Handolin, V. (2004). Systeemiälykäs palkitseminen. In R. Hämäläinen, & E. Saarinen (Eds.), 
Näkökulmia vuorovaikutukseen ja kokonaisuuksien hallintaan. Helsinki University of 
Technology. Systems Analysis Laboratory Research Reports (pp. 51-68). 
Hansen, D. G. (1997). Worker performance and group incentives: A case study. Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, 51(1), 37-49. 
 89  
 
Heimonen, M. (2011). Organizational inertia in a strategic public sector merger: case Aalto 
University. Aalto University School of Science, Department of Industrial Engineering 
and Management. Helsinki: Aalto Print. 
Helsinki School of Economics history. (2014). Retrieved March 3, 2014, from Aalto 
University: http://www.aalto.fi/en/about/history/biz/ 
Heneman, R. L.;& Cohen, D. J. (1988). Supervisory and employee characteristics as 
correlates of employee salary increases. Personnel Psychology, 41(2), 345-360. 
Henri, J. F. (2006). Management control systems and strategy: a resource-based perspective. 
Accounting, organizations and society, 31(6), 529-558. 
Herzberg, F.;Mausner, B.;& Snyderman, B. B. (1959). The motivation to work. New York: 
Wiley. 
Hicks, D. (2012). Performance-based university research funding systems. Research Policy, 
41(2), 251-261. 
Hirsjärvi, S.;& Hurme, H. (2008). Tutkimushaastattelu: Teemahaastattelun teoria ja käytäntö. 
Helsinki: Gaudeamus Helsinki University Press. 
Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons? Public administration, 69(1), 3-19. 
HSE Foundation. (2014). Retrieved July 8, 2014, from Aalto University School of Business: 
http://biz.aalto.fi/en/cooperation/foundation/ 
Hsieh, Y. H.;& Chen, H. M. (2011). Strategic fit among business competitive strategy, human 
resource strategy, and reward system. Academy of Strategic Management Journal, 
10(2), 11-32. 
Hölttä, S. (1998). The funding of universities in Finland: Towards goal-oriented government 
steering. European Journal of Education, 55-63. 
Jensen, M. C.;& Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Kalleberg, A. L. (1977). Work values and job rewards: A theory of job satisfaction. American 
sociological review, 42 (1), 124-143. 
 90  
 
Kallio, K.-M. (2014). "Ketä kiinnostaa tuottaa tutkintoja ja julkaisuja 
liukuhihnaperiaatteella...?" - Suoritusmittauksen vaikutukset tulosohjattujen 
yliopistojen tutkimus- ja opetushenkilökunnan työhön. Doctoral Thesis, University of 
Turku, Turku. 
Kaplan, R. S.;& Norton, D. P. (2001). Transforming the balanced scorecard from 
performance measurement to strategic management: Part II. Accounting Horizons, 
15(2), 147-160. 
Kasanen, E.;Lukka, K.;& Siitonen, A. (1993). The constructive approach in management 
accounting research. Journal of management accounting research, (5), 243-264. 
Kasten, K. L. (1984). Tenure and merit pay as rewards for research, teaching, and service at a 
research university. , . The Journal of Higher Education, 55(4), 500-514. 
Kauhanen, A.;& Piekkola, H. (2006). What makes performance-related pay schemes work? 
Finnish evidence. Journal of Management & Governance, 10(2), 149-177. 
Kominis, G.;& Emmanuel, C. R. (2007). The expectancy–valence theory revisited: 
Developing an extended model of managerial motivation. Management Accounting 
Research, 18(1), 49-75. 
Kreps, M. D. (1997). Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives. The American Economic 
Review, 87 (2), 359-364. 
Kuoppala, K. (2005). Management by results at Finnish universities. Journal of Higher 
Education Policy and Management, 27(3), 345-355. 
Labaree, D. F. (2010). Understanding the rise of American higher education: How complexity 
breeds autonomy. , 3, 007. Peking University Education Review, 31(3), 24-38. 
Lawler, E. E. (1993). Effective Reward Systems: Strategy, Diagnosis, Design, and Change. 
CEO Publication. 
Lawler, E. E. (2003). Reward systems in knowledge-based organizations. In S. E. Jackson, A. 
Denisi, & M. Hitt (Eds.), Managing knowledge for sustained competitive advantage: 
Designing strategies for effective human resource management (pp. 274-302). San 
Fransisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 91  
 
Lawler, E. E., & Jenkins, G. D. (1992). Strategic reward systems. In M. D. Dunnette, & L. M. 
Hough (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial & Organizational Psychology (2nd ed., pp. 
1009-1055). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologist Press. 
Lee, J. (2001). Instructional support for distance education and faculty motivation, 
commitment, satisfaction. British Journal of Educational Technology, 32(2), 153-160. 
Locke, E. A.;& Latham, G. P. (2002). Building a practically useful theory of goal setting and 
task motivation: A 35-year odyssey. American psychologist, 57(9), 705. 
Locke, E. A.;& Latham, G. P. (2006). New directions in goal-setting theory. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 15(5), 265-268. 
Locke, E. A.;Shaw, K. N.;Saari, L. M.;& & Latham, G. P. (1981). Goal setting and task 
performance: 1969–1980. Psychological bulletin, 90(1), 125. 
London, M.;& Oldham, G. R. (1977). A Comparison of Group and Individual Incentive Plans. 
Academy of Management Journal, 20(1), 34-41. 
Lukka, K. (1991). Laskentatoimen tutkimuksen epistemologiset perusteet. Liiketaloudellinen 
aikakauskirja, 40(2), 161-186. 
Malmi, T.;& Brown, D. A. (2008). Management control systems as a package—
Opportunities, challenges and research directions. Management accounting research, 
19(4), 287-300. 
Marginson, S. (2000). Rethinking academic work in the global era. Journal of Higher 
Education Policy and Management, 22(1), 23-35. 
Maslow, A. H.;Frager, R.;& Fadiman, J. (1970). Motivation and personality (2nd p.). New 
York: Harper & Row. 
McPherson, M. S.;& Schapiro, M. O. (1999). Tenure issues in higher education. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 13, 85-98. 
Miner, J. B. (1980). The role of managerial and professional motivation in the career success 
of management professors. Academy of Management Journal, 23(3), 487-508. 
Mitchell, T. R. (1982). Motivation: New directions for theory, research, and practice. 
Academy of management review, 7(1), 80-88. 
 92  
 
Modell, S. (2003). Goals versus institutions: the development of performance measurement in 
the Swedish university sector. Management Accounting Research, 14(4), 333-359. 
Modell, S. (2005). Triangulation between case study and survey methods in management 
accounting research: An assessment of validity implications. Management Accounting 
Research , 16, 231–254. 
Mohrman, S. A. (2003). Designing work for knowledge-based competition. In S. E. Jackson, 
A. Denisi, & M. Hitt (Eds.), Managing knowledge for sustained competitive 
advantage: Designing strategies for effective human resource management (pp. 94-
123). San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Myllyoja, N. (2008, August 31). Aalto-yliopisto ja sen lyhyt historia. tekniikka & talous. 
Nir, A. E.;& Zilberstein-Levy, R. (2006). Planning for academic excellence: tenure and 
professional considerations. Studies in Higher education, 31(5), 537-554. 
OKM. (2014). Governance, control, and financing of universities. Retrieved February 12, 
2014, from Ministry of Education and Culture: 
http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Koulutus/yliopistokoulutus/hallinto_ohjaus_ja_rahoitus/?l
ang=fi 
One of Finland’s most international schools. (2012). Retrieved March 3, 2014, from Aalto 
University School of Arts, Design, and Architecture: 
http://arts.aalto.fi/en/about/international_networks/ 
Oxford Dictionaries. (2014). Retrieved June 27, 2014, from 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/university 
Pal, L. A.;& Ireland, D. (2009). The public sector reform movement: mapping the global 
policy network. International Journal of Public Administration, 32(8), 621-657. 
Pepper, A.;& Gore, J. (2012). Behavioral Agency Theory New Foundations for Theorizing 
About Executive Compensation. Journal of management. 
Pfeffer, J.;& Lawler, J. (1980). Effects of job alternatives, extrinsic rewards, and behavioral 
commitment on attitude toward the organization: A field test of the insufficient 
justification paradigm. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38-56. 
 93  
 
Pinto, G.;& Pulido, E. (1997). Motivation of faculty members at a Latin American university: 
A case study. European journal of engineering education, 22(4), 421-426. 
Pollitt, C. (1995). Justification by works or by faith? Evaluating the new public management. 
Evaluation, 1(2), 133-154. 
Ramsden, P.;Prosser, M.;Trigwell, K.;& Martin, E. (2007). University teachers' experiences 
of academic leadership and their approaches to teaching. Learning and Instruction, 
17(2), 140-155. 
Rantanen, H.;Kulmala, H. I.;Lönnqvist, A.;& Kujansivu, P. (2007). Performance 
measurement systems in the Finnish public sector. International Journal of Public 
Sector Management, 20(5), 415-433. 
Ryan, R. M.;& Deci, E. L. (2000a). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations: Classic definitions and 
new directions. Contemporary educational psychology, 25(1), 54-67. 
Ryan, R. M.;& Deci, E. L. (2000b). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic 
motivation, social development, and well-being. American psychologist, 55(1), 68. 
Saarikivi, J. (2014, July 14). Kun puhumme maailman parhaasta. Helsingin Sanomat, p. 
Tiede. 
Scapens, R. W. (1990). Researching management accounting practice: The role of case study 
methods. British Accounting Review, 22, 259–281. 
Sehested, K. (2002). How new public management reforms challenge the roles of 
professionals. International Journal of Public Administration, 25(12), 1513-1537. 
Smeemk, S.;Teelken, C.;Eisinga, R.;& Doorewaard, H. (2009). Managerialism, organizational 
commitment, and quality of job performances among European university employees. 
Research in Higher Education, 50(6), 589-607. 
Staples, D. S.;Hulland, J. S.;& Higgins, C. A. (1998). A self-efficacy theory explanation for 
the management of remote workers in virtual organizations. Journal of Computer-
Mediated Communication, 3(4), 0-0. 
Steel, P.;& König, C. J. (2006). Integrating theories of motivation. Academy of Management 
Review, 31(4), 889-913. 
 94  
 
Steers, R. M.;Mowday, R. T.;& Shapiro, D. L. (2004). Steers, R. M., Mowday, R. T., & 
Shapiro, D. L. (2004). Introduction to special topic forum: The future of work 
motivation theory. The Academy of Management Review, 29(3), 379-387. 
Stelwagen, M. (2013). Rewarding at Aalto University. Presentation in Roadshow of 
Rewarding for Aalto staff on 28th of November 2013. Helsinki School of Business, 
Helsinki. 
Sutton, T. P., & Bergerson, P. J. (2001). Faculty Compensation Systems: Impact on the 
Quality of Higher Education (Vols. ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Report, 28(2)). 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
ter Bogt, H. J.;& Scapens, R. W. (2012). Performance management in universities: effects of 
the transition to more quantitative measurement systems. European Accounting 
Review, 21(3), 451-497. 
Thorsen, E. J. (1996). Stress in academe: What bothers professors? Higher Education, 31(4), 
471-489. 
Tikkanen, H. (21. May 2014). Yliopistouudistuksen totutus vaatii rohkeutta. Helsingin 
Sanomat. 
Tosi, H. L.;Katz, J. P.;& Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1997). Disaggregating the agency contract: The 
effects of monitoring, incentive alignment, and term in office on agent decision 
making. Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), 584-602. 
Tullock, G. (1996). Corruption theory and practice. Contemporary economic policy, 14(3), 6-
13. 
Universities Act 558/2009. (n.d.). 
Universities Funding Model. (2012). Retrieved February 11, 2014, from Ministry of 
Education and Culture: 
http://www.minedu.fi/export/sites/default/OPM/Koulutus/yliopistokoulutus/hallinto_o
hjaus_ja_rahoitus/liitteet/OKM_rahoitusmalli-muistio.pdf 
Vaivio, J. (2008). Qualitative management accounting research: rationale pitfalls and 
potential. Qualitative Research in Accounting and Management, 5(1) 64–86. 
 95  
 
Van Herpen, M., van Praag, M., & Cools, K. (2005). The effects of performance 
measurement and compensation on motivation: An empirical study. De Economist, 
153(3), 303-329. 
Wiseman, R. M.;& Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998). A behavioral agency model of managerial 
risk taking. Academy of management Review, 23(1), 133-153. 
Wright, B. E. (2001). Public-Sector Work Motivation: A Review of the Current Literature and 
Revised Conceptual Model. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 4, 
559-586. 
  
 96  
 
APPENDIXES 
Appendix 1: Professors’ rewarding model survey 
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Appendix 2: Structure of the management interviews 
Goals and achieving them: 
- What are the goals of Aalto/the individual schools? What are the primary objectives? 
- How do you think the professors could be guided and motivated towards achieving 
these goals? 
Rewarding: 
- Which rewarding elements should the overall rewarding consist of? 
- Do you think an incentive system is a good way to steer and motivate professors? Is it 
needed? 
- How do you think merit increase and bonus/incentive systems relate to each other? 
- Which measures do you think a bonus system should consist of (taking the Aalto and 
School objectives into account)? 
- What about merit increase? 
- In which form should the bonus be paid? Should it be paid individually or to the 
research group? 
- What other ways of rewarding could be possible to instead of an incentive system? 
- Should each school have a distinctive incentive system? 
Reward systems:  
- How good do you think the current incentive system at Aalto is? 
- What about the old TKK system? 
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Appendix 3: Structure of the ARTS interviews 
Background: 
- What is your work history like? How have you gotten to ARTS? 
- What expectations do you have regarding your future career? 
- Do you have working experience from other universities? 
- Are you a full-time professor at the moment? 
Work and motivation: 
- What is important for you in your work? 
- What motivates you as a professor? How has this evolved during your career? 
- What motivates you for the following: 
 research 
 teaching 
 artistic activities 
 societal impact 
 administration 
- Which areas of work are you concentrated on in Aalto? Research, teaching, arts? 
- What other possible projects/work do you have outside Aalto?  
Goals (Aalto and own): 
- Which goals of Aalto are important for you and your work? 
- How do your personal goals differ from those of Aalto? How could the possible 
difference be decreased? 
- Could rewarding have influence in this?  
- What kind of holistic rewarding would affect aligning the goals? 
Rewarding: 
- How would an ideal reward system be like in your opinion? 
- What kind of reward system would motivate you to work according to Aalto’s goals?  
- If you think about your work in Aalto, do you think the current rewarding is at a 
sufficient level and that the ways of rewarding are suitable? 
- What would be the best ways of rewarding for you? What about ARTS in general? 
- Do you think that a bonus in some form would be relevant? (e.g. for motivating, 
recognition..) 
- If not: Could there be another way to acknowledge great performance? Recognition? 
- If yes: What area of work would be relevant for ARTS to reward? (what takes a lot of 
time, is aligned to Aalto’s goals) 
- Interdisciplinarity is strength in ARTS; how could it be considered in rewarding? 
- Do you think an Aalto-wide reward system could work? Including an option to vary 
the system at the school level. 
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Appendix 4: Timetable of the interviews 
Date Interviewee 
Wed May 28 Top manager A at Aalto level 
Tue June 3 Dean A 
Tue June 3 ARTS professor A, Department of Architecture 
Mon June 9 Top manager B at Aalto level 
Mon June 9 Dean B 
Wed June 11 Dean C 
Fri June 13 Dean D 
Fri June 13 ARTS professor B, Department of Design 
Fri June 13 Dean E 
Mon June 16 Dean F 
 
